Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State Legislation by Krischer, David E
Boston College Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 5
2-1-1972
Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State
Legislation
David E. Krischer
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Student Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David E. Krischer, Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State Legislation, 13 B.C.L. Rev. 529
(1972), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol13/iss3/5
FRANCHISE REGULATION: AN APPRAISAL OF
RECENT STATE LEGISLATIONt
The franchise boom of the past decade has evidenced unpre-
cedented growth in the franchise industry. In those years the number of
franchised outlets doubled, from three hundred thousand' to nearly
six hundred thousand units.2 Current annual sales through franchised
outlets are approximately ninety billion dollars and represent nearly
ten percent of the country's Gross National Product.' Although there
was some movement during the sixties toward regulation of this signi-
ficant sector of the economy, 4 legislative action was frustrated by con-
flicting and sometimes passionate argumentation supported by inac-
curate and misleading statistics.° In addition, until recently franchisor
associations had seen no need for "remedial legislation" for even the
"acknowledged imperfections" in franchising,' and currently they re-
main unwilling to accept more than partial legislation." Subject to con-
t This comment was introduced into the public record at the Federal Trade Com-
mission Hearings on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Involving Disclosure Requirements
and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, FTC Doc. No. 215-34 (Feb. 14, 1972). The
proposed rule is found at 36 Fed. Reg. 21607, 22187 (1971).
1 Band, Franchise Statistics: Their Uses and Abuses, in Franchising Today 1969 at
45 (C. Vaughn ed. 1969) (based on data included in the statement of the International
Franchise Association [hereinafter IFA] Before the Subcomm. of the House Select Comm.
on Small Business, Nov., 1963).
2 Vaughn, Growth and Future of Franchising, in Franchising Today 1969 at 269 (C.
Vaughn ed. 1969).
3 Hearings on The Impact of Franchising on Small Business, Before the Subcomm.
on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
4 At the federal level Senator Hart's bill regulating franchise terminations was first
introduced as H.R. 10113, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). It was redrafted and introduced
as S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and again as S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The bill was recently reintroduced, on August 6, 1971, as S. 2472, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). For state bills regulating franchising introduced in the sixties see Rudnick, State
Legislation Affecting Franchising, in IFA Legal Bulletin 1969 II at 36 (L. Rudnick ed.
1969).
5 See, e.g., statements of Harold Brown, J.F. Atkinson, Robert Dias, Philip Zeidman
and the Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz, 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2, 49, 111, 140, and 522,
respectively. Compare H. Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting (1969) with J. At-
kinson, Franchising: The Odds-On Favorite (1968). For an objective analysis see Report
of Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising, in 2 The Franchising Sourcebook, app. A, 561 (J.
McCord ed. 1970).
6 See Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., The Economic
Effects of Franchising 66 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as Economic Effects of
Franchising]. The study recommends that the IFA withdraw from circulation all copies of
the book Franchising: The Odds-On Favorite by J.F. Atkinson, because "[t]he book pre-
sents grossly inaccurate data on failure rates and would be very misleading to potential
franchisees." Id.
I Statement of Philip Zeidman, Washington Counsel, IFA, 1970 Hearings, supra note
3, at 140, 143.
8 IFA Position Paper, "Views of the International Franchise Association Relative to
State Franchise Legislation," at 3 (1971) (on file in office of B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev);
Brown, Franchising: Legislating Full Disclosure, Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 15 Boston
B.J. No. 8 at 15, 19 (1971).
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stant lobbying pressure from these associations, many states have
remained unable to enact much-needed legislation .°
The recent economic recession brought ruin to many franchisors
and their franchisees." This financial disaster exposed to public
scrutiny the abuses to which franchisees are subject from the time the
franchise relationship begins until long after it ends. 11 As a result of
the increased public awareness of such abuses, the seventies are witness-
ing widespread franchising legislation." This comment will survey the
approaches taken by the various states in their attempts to deal with
franchise abuses. First, the abuses will be summarized so that the
purpose of franchise legislation may be placed in perspective. The
failings of the traditional remedies to cope with these abuses will then
be examined in order to indicate the urgent need for franchise legisla-
tion. State regulations, both enacted and proposed, will be discussed and
compared." The comment will focus upon exemplary statutes for the
purpose of in depth analysis; reference will be made to similar legisla-
tion of other states. Finally, proposed federal measures will be com-
pared with the state approaches to the problems of franchising.
I. FRANCHISE ABUSES
Franchise abuses are not merely "imperfections" in an otherwise
equitable system. Such abuses, both actual and potential, are extensive
and pervade the entire relationship. When a prospective franchisee
expresses an initial interest in purchasing a franchise, he is usually
bombarded with offering literature that is "either inadequate, mislead-
ing, wholly lacking or blatantly false as to material facts necessary to
making an intelligent investment decision."" The advertisement creat-
9
 See Report of Lewis G. Rudnick, 4th Annual Franchising and Government Sym-
posium of the IFA, May 17, 18 and 19, 1971 (Report on file in office of B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev.). An example of the success of the IFA's lobbying efforts is the amendment to the
Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act which delays the effective date of the
Act for one year, ostensibly to "afford the IFA an opportunity to propose and advocate
a substitute law." Id. at II.
10
 Elliott, No Burned Fingers, Barron's, April 12, 1971, at 3, col. 1; Paulson, Fran-
chises Shaken by Hard Times, The National Observer, July 8, 1971, at 8, col. 1.
11 Id.; Moneysworth, Aug. 9, 1971, at I, col. 1; Noble, One Man vs. An Industry,
Newsday, Sept. 8, 1971, at 72A, col. 1.
12 lc ---,ray Legislatures Acting on Franchising, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1871, § 3 (Busi-
ness), at 13, col. I ; Wong, In Absence of Federal Rules, More States Begin Regulating the
Franchising Industry, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1971, at 22, col. 1. •
18 This article will not deal with state legislation which is limited to specific types of
franchises. In fact, the single-industry approach appears misguided. "It is inadequate if all
industries are not covered, and it is unnecessary to cover each industry separately." Cana-
dian Dept. of Financial & Commercial Affairs, Report of the Minister's Committee on
Franchising, at 52-53 (1971). The best example of the single-industry approach is the
legislation passed in response to extensive automobile dealer lobbying which is designed to
protect the automobile dealer only. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 93B (1971). For
an.excellent analysis of the Massachusetts law and a compilation of other state automobile
franchising legislation, see • Brown, A Bill of Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. Ind. & Cora.
L. Rev. 757, 758 n.5 (1971).. •
14 Statement of the Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State of New
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ing the prospective franchisee's.initial interest may have been filled with
misleading information" despite the claim of many publishers that
they screen such ads." Potential profits" and potential volume of
sales" are usually overstated to an alarming degree. A recent study of
franchise abuses in New York State revealed that the franchisee may
purchase a franchise from a company involved in a bankruptcy re-
organization without any notice of the financial condition of the fran-
chisor." The study also, revealed that the franchisee may find himself
owning a franchise in a company controlled or dominated by ex-
convicts or persons presently under indictinent. 20 In either case the
franchisee may lose an investment representing his life savings. 21
Once the franchise agreement has been signed, the franchisee
becomes subject to an entirely new set of abuses. Promised assistance
and equipment may not be immediately available, and may never
become available due to insufficient capitalization by the franchisor. 22
The franchisor may even fail to deliver the franchised business itself
within a reasonable time after consummation of the sale. 23 Futhermore,
as a result of the franchisee's relatively weak bargaining position, the
franchise agreement often contains inequitable provisions 24 such as
"tying arrangements" (clauses requiring franchisees to buy unwanted
equipment or supplies "tied" to necessary items). These arrangements
are used in the franchise agreement to force the franchisee to buy all
supplies exclusively from the franchisor, sometimes at two or three
times the fair market price.25 Fortunately" for the franchisee, such
clauses are now generally regarded as per se violative of the antitrust
laws.2° The franchisor is now permitted to require exclusive purchasing
York, 1970 Hearings, supra note 3, at 522, 523 [hereinafter cited as Lefkowitz, 1970 Hear-
ings].
15
 National Dynamics Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1f 19,653 at 21,710 (initial decision
to cease and desist, May 24, 1971) ; international Sales Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,663 at
21,715 (consent order to cease and desist, June 22, 1971).
Statement of Julius Schmitt, Classified Advertising Manager, N.Y. Times, 1970
Hearings, supra note 3, at 506. "[W]e require ... bank and . . . business references .. .
[and] a copy of the franchise contract ... ." Id. at 507. Statement of Joseph Perrone,
National Classified Advertising Manager, Dow Jones & Co., id. at 572-73. But see state-
ment of David Shulman, Editor & Publisher, Franchise Journal, id. at 574.
17 "72.5% of the franchisees earned less than the 'minimum expected,' 91.8% earned
less than the 'average expected' • ." Economic Effects of Franchising, supra note 6, at 143.
18 "69.6% of franchisees in 1969 failed to reach the 'minimum expected sales volume'
[and] 86.9% failed to reach the 'average sales volume' .. ." Id. at 145-46. See Barton's
Candy Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 19,554 at 21,624 (consent order to cease and desist,
Mar. 18, 1971).
10 
Id.
9 ILefkowitz, 1970 Hearings, supra note 14, at 524.2
21 Id. at 531.
22 Statement of Robert Dias, Pres., Nat'l Ass'n of Franchise Businessmen, 1970 Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 117, 124 hereinafter cited as Dias, 1970 Hearings].
28 Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 Hast. L.J. 1347, 1373-74 (1970).
24 Economic Effects of Franchising, supra note 6, 261-62.
25 Brown, supra noie•5, at 16.'
20 Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). •
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only when quality or secret processes cannot be adequately protected by
specification of purchasing requirements." However, under the guise
of "quality control," operating franchisees are still often required to
purchase either from approved suppliers or from the franchisor him-
self. Besides possessing inherent anticompetitive effects, buying from
approved suppliers often presents the problem of kickbacks from the
supplier to the franchisor." In fact, over forty percent of the fran-
chisees canvassed in a study sponsored by the Small Business Adminis-
tration" either knew or suspected that their franchisors were taking
kickbacks." The study concluded that such widespread belief "cannot
be entirely dismissed as misperception.""
Of all the abuses to which a franchisee may be subject, those oc-
curing in the context of renewal or termination of the franchise agree-
ment are perhaps the most sensitive.32 The problem is pervasive: termi-
nation clauses appear in one hundred percent of all fast food franchise
agreements. 33 From the franchisor's viewpoint, actual termination of a
franchise as a means of coercing franchisees to comply with the desires
of the franchisor is often undesirable. However, a threat of termi-
nation may effectively accomplish the franchisor's goal without entail-
ing the drawbacks of actual termination. Although some disagreement
exists as to the extent to which termination threats are used, there
is little disagreement that the fear of actual termination has a sub-
stantial effect on franchisees. 34 The franchisor plays on this fear to
compel the franchisee "to adhere to practices which may be detrimental
to his business—such as directed purchases, handling only products of
the franchisor, retail price maintenance, not selling to selected custo-
mers, unprofitable mandatory working hour requirements, etc.""
In addition, provisions in the franchise agreement which appear
reasonable on their face may be discriminatorily enforced with respect
to an individual franchisee, and thereby used to terminate either recal-
citrant or extremely profitable franchises, in the latter case so that the
27 Id. at 51. Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
28 Brown, supra note 5, at 16.
28 See note 6 supra.
38 Economic Effects of Franchising, supra note 6, at 162.
31 Id. at 163.
82 Id. at 269.
83 Id. at 274.
84 Brown, supra note 5, at 22: "[T]he franchisee must live in constant peril of ter-
mination of his franchise and loss of his investment." See also Economic Effects of Fran-
chising, supra note 6, at 276. This study found that while only 12.9% of the franchisees
interviewed had ever been directly threatened with termination by their franchisors, never-
theless "franchisees may feel an implied threat of termination because of the way most
franchise agreements dwell on the franchisor's right to terminate." Id.
n5 Dias, 1970 Hearings, supra note 22, at 125. See Shanahan, Illegal Franchise Actions
Laid to Chock Full o'Nuts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1971, at 71, col. 7. The Federal Trade
Commission has accused Chock Full o'Nuts Corp. of enforcing its illegal pricing policies
by informing its licensees "that their franchise agreements would be terminated if the items
were sold at other than the specified prices." Id..
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franchisor may take over the franchise himself." Requirements which
may be discriminatorily applied include those to keep franchise pre-
mises open for business twelve hours a day, 365 days per year; to keep
sidewalks and parking area free and clear of snow, ice and rubbish;
to use only equipment and fixtures approved by the franchisor; to wear
uniforms specified by the franchisor; to present a neat and clean ap-
pearance; and to render competent and courteous service." As a
result, more than seventy-five percent of the fast food franchisees
interviewed in the previously referred to Small Business Administra-
don study's felt that federal legislation was needed which would permit
termination of a franchise only if the franchisee failed to "substantially
comply" with the provisions of the franchise contract8° Finally, follow-
ing termination, and regardless of its reason, the franchisee may be
subject to a far-reaching covenant not to compete," generally upheld
by the courts if not "unreasonable."' The covenant usually provides
that the franchisee will not engage in a competing business within a
designated locale for a prescribed period:" Because direct remediation
of franchise abuses has only recently been attempted through state
legislation, franchisees in the past sought to protect themselves from
abuses by means of traditional common law remedies.
II. THE TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
Although it has been suggested that the franchise agreement be
considered as establishing a fiduciary relationship between franchisor
and franchisee," or that certain portions of the Uniform Commercial
Code could be used to reach franchise abuses," historically most ag-
grieved franchisees have relied upon common law fraud actions or suits
instituted under antitrust laws in order to obtain relief. It is the failure
of these remedies which has created the need for franchise legislation.
The action for fraud has generally been applied in the context of
abuses in the sale of a franchise." The number of fraud complaints 'has
80
 Dias, 1970 Hearings, supra note 22, at 121; Economic Effects of Franchising, supra
note 6, at 275. Cf. Oxenfeldt & Kelly, Will Successful Franchise Systems Ultimately Be-
come Wholly-Owned Chains?, 44 J. Retailing No. 4, 69, 70-72 (1969).
aT Economic Effects of Franchising, supra note 6, at 275.
118 See note 6 supra.
8° Economic Effects of Franchising, supra note 6, at 277.
40 Brown, supra note 5, at 27.
41 Restatement of Contracts, 516(f) (1932).
42 Brown, supra note 5, at 27.
40 Brown, Franchising—A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Texas L. Rev. 650 (1971) ; Jirna
Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd., (19711 13 D.L.R.3d 645 (1970), rev'd, 1 Karas
Exec. Rep. No. 14, at 1 (Oct. 11, 1971). The lower court found that "the close association
of the franchisor and the franchisee in this case has created what must be construed as a
fiduciary relationship... ." [1971] 13 D.L.R.3d at 654..
44 Comment, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Distribu-
tion Agreements, 1969 Duke L.J. 959 (1969).
48 H. Brown, The Realities of Franchising,' in 2 The Franchising Sourcebook 191, at
199 (J. McCord ed. 1970). For an example of a fraud complaint see An Illustrative Com-
plaint, in The Realities of Franchising, A Guido for the Practicing Attorney 99 (1970).
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increased in recent years due to widespread use of misrepresentations'
of fact and deCeptive advertising in the sale of franchises." Such mis-
representations are employed in order to sell as many franchise units
as possible since "many franchisors receive a substantial portion of
their gross income from the sale of franchises.... Consequently, there
is an incentive to tell the prospective franchisee almost anything to
make the sale."" If the requirements of fraud can be proved," the
court may award damages or grant rescission of the franchise contract.
In addition to reliance damages, the franchisee may recover excessive
franchise fees and royalties, and overpayments made due to restrictive
purchasing agreements. Rescission, on the other hand, would attempt
to restore the parties to their precontract positions insofar as is rea-
sonably possible."
Despite these remedies the effectiveness of actions for fraud in
controlling franchise abuses has been limited by several factors. First,
many franchisees fail to file complaints; 5° even if complaints are filed,
the remedies are often unsatisfactory since the fraud action is an "after
the fact" remedy." The franchisee has already paid out the franchise
fee and has often incurred substantial losses in running the business. 52
Thus, in many instances, the franchisee is insolvent and cannot afford
to retain counsel to pursue a civil action.' Even if successful, victory
often comes after protracted litigation and may be fruitless; the fran-
chisor is often bankrupt and thus judgment-proof."
Actions have been brought against franchisors for violations of.
the antitrust laws:55 These cases have dealt largely with the abuses
46 Statement of Clark Bradley, California State Senator, 1970 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 595-96 [hereinafter cited as Bradley, 1970 Hearings]. It previously was disclosed at the
California Franchise Hearings , that with respect to criminal complaints the franchise fraud
area has risen from a "comparatively minor place to Na. 1 in terms of formal investigations
and work load in the business fraud division . .." Id. at 596.
47 Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 23, at 1370-71.
48
 The common law action of deceit consisted of five elements: a false representation
by the defendant, ordinarily a misrepresentation of fact; knowledge or belief on the part
of the defendant that the representation was false; an intention to induce the plaintiff to
act or refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation; justifiable reliance upon
the representation on the part of the plaintiff; damage to the plaintiff resulting from such
reliance. W. Prosser, Law of Torts 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
4D Brown, supra note 5, at 35.
50 The reasons usually given for this failure are:
(1) the typical victim is embarrassed over being swindled and is thus reluctant
to file a complaint;
(2) he believes that he cannot help his own cause by filing a complaint;
(3) he hopes to salvage his investment and spends more time and money doing
so, invariably resulting in further losses; and
(4) he feels that it is too late for recourse, because of the time span between the
payment of the franchise fee and the discovery of the fraud.
Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 46, at 597.
51 Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 23, at 1373.
52 Id.
ns See Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra' note 46, at 597.
54 Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 23, at 1373.
55 The ramifications of the antitrust laws on franchising have' been extensively dis-
534
• STATE FRANCHISE LEGISLATION '
which occur during the existence of the franchise relationship, with
courts inquiring into the reasonableness of the controls and restrictions
imposed by the franchise agreements." Despite the demonstrated anti-
trust illegality of many franchisor practices," franchisors have been
unwilling to cease such practices. At the core of this recalcitrance may
be a realization by franchisors that the antitrust laws are relatively
ineffective at reaching franchising abuses and hence pose little threat
of financial loss. It is known, for example, that few franchisees can
afford to maintain an antitrust suit; and the threatened loss of even
treble damages in the isolated instances which result in litigation of ten
fails to outweigh the potential profits to be gained from the illegal
practice."
Despite the salutary effect of Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,"
the antitrust laws generally remain ineffective as remedies for franchise
abuses. The antitrust remedy suffers weaknesses similar to those of
the fraud action. It is also an "after the fact" remedy and, as in fraud
actions, the franchisee may be insolvent and unable to afford the ex-
pense of litigation." This is especially true since the complex antitrust
action usually involves substantial pretrial discovery and large expendi-
tures of time by the attorney involved.°1 The cost, viewed in light of the
possibility of losing the suit, may deter even solvent franchisees from
maintaining such actions. To some extent, however, this risk has been
alleviated by the recent liberalization of class actions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.°2
cussed; see D. Thompson, Franchise Operations and Antitrust (1971) ; J. Curtin, P. Dono-
van, & J. Rally, Application of Antitrust and Trade Regulation Statutes, in The Realities
of Franchising, A Guide for the Practicing Attorney 27 (1970) ; Pollock, Antitrust Prob•
lems in Franchising, 15 N.Y. L.F. 106 (1969) ; Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws:
Panacea or Problem?, 42 Notre Dame Law. 605 (1967) ; Zeidman, Antitrust Aspects of
Franchising, 45 Michigan State B. J . No. 5, at 27 (1966).
60 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts, 392 U.S. 134 (1968) ; Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) ; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967) ; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) ; FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316 (1966) ; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
Si Albrecht v. Herald Co. 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (combination to fix maximum prices)
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical territorial restric-
tions) ; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 .(1967) (horizontal territorial restric-
tions) ; F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (exclusive dealing provisions) ;
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (tying arrangement).
68 Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 23, at 1353.
00 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). Here an antitrust class action by franchisees against
their franchisor was successful in proving a tying arrangement in violation of the. Sherman
Act. But even here the franchisees may have won only a nominal victory; the case was
remanded by the Circuit Court of Appeals for a limited trial as to whether damage had
resulted (a complicated issue because Chicken Delight did not collect royalties or franchise
fees but received 100% of its income from the sale of supplies and equipment).
00 Curtin, Donovan, & Hally, supra note 55, at 51: "Antitrust cases . . . are among
the most expensive litigation processes known." Id.
01 Id.
62 Fed. R. Clv. P. 23.
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The class action was successfully utilized in the Chicken Delight
case by five plaintiffs who brought an antitrust suit on behalf of six
hundred and fifty franchisees. However, the defeated franchisor,
faced with an enormous treble damage judgment, will probably be
forced into bankruptcy, leaving his franchisees stranded. Although in
some franchises a franchisee can continue to operate without a fran-
chisor, a situation in which the franchisee's profit margin would be in-
creased since he would no longer be making royalty payments to a
franchisor, there are far more franchises in which the interests of the
franchisor and franchisee are so interrelated that, should the fran-
chisor become bankrupt, the franchisee would follow." Even in those
cases in which the franchisee could continue to operate, he would be
faced with many new problems, the most difficult being that he could
no longer use the franchisor's trademark. Instead, the franchisee would
have to operate under a new name, one less well known to the public.
Thus franchisees who employ an antitrust class action must be pre-
pared not only for protracted litigation but also, in the event of success,
for the probability that the franchise system will be destroyed, leaving
the franchisees to fend for themselves."
A final reason for the remedial ineffectiveness of the antitrust laws
in franchising abuses is that the antitrust laws do not even reach many
franchising abuses. The antitrust laws do not apply to franchisor mis-
representations, to the sale of a franchise by a bankrupt franchise com-
pany or one run by criminals, or to restrictions dealing with transfer,
renewal or termination of the franchise. -Because of these limitations,
the federal antitrust laws have been inadequate to combat franchise
abuses.
Recently the franchise investment has begun to be viewed as an
investment in a security and therefore subject to regulatory state and
federal securities statutes. This development has been at least partially
in response to the ineffectiveness of the traditional remedies, and parti-
ally due to the belief that the franchise agreement may properly be
viewed as a security. On the federal level several cases have raised the
question of whether the franchise agreement is a security, but in each
case the court failed to decide the issue." However, in another context,
63 271 F. Supp. 722, 724-25 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
04 Especially in those situations where the franchisee is dependent upon transient
customers who rely upon the franchise trademark and in those instances in which a secret
process is involved.
05
 If the trademark, which is simply another asset of the bankrupt franchisor, is un-
saleable, there is a possibility that the franchisee could reach an agreement with the fran-
chisor's trustee in bankruptcy wherein the franchisee would give up his claim for treble
damages in exchange for the right to use the franchisor's tradename. Most likely, however,
the trustee will be able to sell the tradename, in which case the franchisee would have
to reach an agreement with the new trademark owner if he wished to continue to use the
tradename.
06 See Eelhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964); Drug Management;
Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., C.C.H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,293 (D.D.C. 1963). See Goodwin,
Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts,
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in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.," the Supreme Court established guide-
lines for defining a security: "[t]he test is whether the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others." Since most franchises con-
template operation by the franchisee rather than solely by the fran-
chisor, it is probable that there can be no attempt at federal regulation
of the franchise as a security.
On the state level, however, this approach has met with some suc-
cess. In June, 1967, the Attorney General of California stated in an
opinion to the State Commissioner of Corporations that a franchise
arrangement may constitute a security within the meaning of the
Corporate Securities Law.0
 He contemplated two situations as subject
to regulation. The first exists when the franchisee, in exchange for a
share of the profits, contributes capital but otherwise is only "nominally
involved" in the management of the business. 7° This situation would be
included within the definition of a security offered by the Supreme
Court in Howey. Although a question may arise as to when nominal
involvement becomes active involvement,' the majority of franchises
are not subject to regulation on this basis because the franchisee usually
takes an active part in the management of the business.'
The second contemplated situation subject to regulation as a se-
curity arises when, although the franchisee actively participates in the
franchise business, the franchisor intends to utilize the franchise fee
substantially to finance the purchase of the goods and services he has
agreed to supply the franchisee." In this context, the regulation of a
franchise as a security relies upon the concept of "risk capital (com-
prising risky, risked or initial capital) being raised by the franchisor
from franchise fees in excess of the reasonable cost of the sale, ad-
vertising and promotion (including a fair profit) of franchises, and so
really an investment by the franchisee in the franchisor's busi-
ness. . 2' 74
 Resolution of the issue of whether a franchise may be reg-
Including 10 b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. Law. 1311 (1969); but see Coleman, A Franchise
Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. Law. 493 (1967).
07 328 U.S. 293 (1947).
08
 Id. at 301.
69 Opinion of Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, State of California, 49 Ops, Cal.
Att'y Gen. 124 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Opinion of Cal. Att'y Gen.] in Hearings on
the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural
Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, app. XI, at 771-78 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
70 Id. at 773.
71 Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 23, at 1358.
72 Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 46, at 595.
79
 Opinion of Cal. Att'y Gen., supra note 69, at 777.
74 Goodwin, supra note 66, at 1320. Instead of selling securities to the public to raise
capital, thereby becoming subject to the securities laws, the franchisor raises his initial
capital from the franchisee. Generally such a franchisor is inadequately capitalized and
takes money from one franchisee to fulfill his previously existing obligations to another
franchisee, and so on, until the chain stops and the house of cards falls. "At this point the
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ulated as a security thus becomes dependent upon the determination
of whether the franchisor is adequately capitalized, a difficult question
to resolve.
To alleviate difficulties with capitalization, the California Depart-
ment of Corporations somewhat arbitrarily ruled that if a franchisor has
a net worth of over $500,000 immediately prior to the sale of the
franchise he will be considered to be adequately capitalized and the
franchise will not be subject to regulation as a security." However, it
is possible for a franchisor to be adequately capitalised with less than
$500,000 and under-capitalized with more than $500,000. 7° Further-
more, a franchisor who originally may have been adequately capitalized
may subsequently become inadequately capitalized. To keep up with
such changes, periodic audits of a franchisor's financial status would be
necessary. Due to the number of franchisors and the great expense of
such audits, regulation of franchises via security regulations would
appear to be merely "a futile gesture.""
Additional deficiencies in the securities approach result from the
fact that this approach does not deal with such franchise abuses as
deceptive advertising, misrepresentation and overly • restrictive fran-
chise agreements resulting from inequality of bargaining power. Further-
more, suits under the securities laws are subject to the same criticisms
as the traditional remedies: a suit for violation of securities regulations
is an "after the fact" remedy involving lengthy litigation, high cost
and potentially no more than a pyrrhic victory.
The combination of documented abuses and historically in-
adequate remedies has made legislation necessary and inevitable. Al-
though a uniform federal law would have been ideal," such legislation
has not been forthcoming. Congressional inaction has resulted in the
initiation of state legislative action despite the difficulty most state
legislatures have had in determining which legislative approach to
take. As a result of the wide range of potential legislative solutions,
a wide divergence of regulatory approaches characterizes present state
franchising legislation. This comment will now survey the various
approaches taken by states enacting such legislation.
III. STATE LEGISLATION
State franchising legislation may be divided into three categories:
(a) disclosure legislation, (b) substantive legislation and (c) termi-
nation legislation. Disclosure legislation generally requires the fran-
chisor to register the franchise with a state agency and/or direct dis-
franchiser lsicl is left with many obligations he cannot fulfill, to franchisees, suppliers,
contractors, and others." Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 46, at 596.
75 10 Cal. Admin. Code § 260,105.4 (1969).
7 n Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 46, at 596.
77 Id.
78 See Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 Hast. LI 1347, 1374 (1970);
IFA Position Paper, "Views of the International Franchise Association Relative to State
Franchise Legislation," at '2 (1971) (on file in office of B.C. Ind. & Coro. L. Rev.).
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closure of material information to the prospective franchisee prior to
his purchase of the franchise. The premise behind this form of legis-
lation is that the disclosed information will enable a prospective fran-
chisee to make an intelligent judgment as to whether he wishes to
purchase the franchise. Substantive legislation, on the other hand, at-
tempts to regulate the relationship of the parties during the period of
operation under the franchise agreement. Such legislation is based on
the belief that, even with adequate information, the unequal bargaining
power of the franchisee places him in the position where his interests
can be protected only by government regulation of the continuing re-
lationship of the parties. Termination legislation is the result of
numerous complaints of unusually widespread abuses in this area. Such
legislation generally prohibits termination or refusal to renew without
cause. Termination legislation has recently undergone a constitutional
attack which may make state regulation in this area impossible."
Before these approaches may be discussed, attention must be given
to a problem common to all three forms of franchise legislation: the
determination of who should be included within, or excluded from, the
scope of the legislation. This determination is generally considered to
to be the most difficult task in drafting franchise legislation." The
difficulty stems from the fact that franchises cover such a wide range
of business operations that a definition drafted to cover all might be
overly broad, including operations not really franchises, while a limited
definition may not include all those operations desired to be covered."
Secondly, considerations of public policy and administrative con-
venience may act to restrict the scope of the operations sought to be
covered by the definition. Two aspects of the resolution of this pro-
blem are significant. The legislation may take a definitional approach
and set forth a series of requirements by defining the term "franchise"
and thus indirectly include or exclude specific types of operations; the
legislation may exclude an otherwise included operation by specific
exemption from the legislative provisions.
A. Legislative Scope: Franchise Defined
The proposed Massachusetts Franchise Fair Dealing Act gives a
broad definition of the term "franchise" and serves as an example of
the definitional approach:
Franchise shall mean an oral' or written arrangement for a
definite or indefinite period, in which a person grants to an-
other person a license to use a tradename, service mark, or
related characteristics, and in which there is a community of
70 See discussion at pp. 558-60 infra.
8° Sec Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 46, at 598; Canadian Dept. of Financial &
Commercial Affairs, Report of the Minister's Committee on Franchising, at 36 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Minister's Committee Report].
81 Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising, in 2 The Franchising Sourcehook,
app. A, 561, 564 (J. McCord ed. 1970); Minister's Committee Report, supra note 80, at
36-37.
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interest in the marketing of goods or services at wholesale,
retail, leasing or otherwise."
Under this definition the fundamental characteristic of a franchise
is the franchisor's permission to the franchisee for use of the
franchisor's tradename. The requirement of "a community- of interest
in the marketing" means merely that both the franchisor and franchisee
have a common interest in the marketing of the goods or services:
"each . . . derive is] a material benefit and sustain[s] a mutual respon-
sibility."86
The interesting aspect of the "community of interest" requirement
is that this language could be found to create fiduciary duties in the
franchise relationship, a result which no American court as yet has
considered." Historically, the term "community of interest" has been
used in connection with common ownership of securities and other
property 8E In these cases the courts have stated that a "[c] ommunity
of interest involves mutual obligation," 86 and "creates such a relation
of trust and confidence that it is inequitable to permit one of the parties
in interest to do anything to the prejudice of others ... ."87 By analogy,
a court interpreting the Massachusetts definition could find that the
legislature intended to create a fiduciary relationship between the
franchisor and franchisee "in the marketing of goods or services," by
denoting the relationship as a "community of interest." Since common
interest in the marketing of goods or services is the basis for the
franchise, fiduciary duties could be found to pervade the entire rela-
tionship.88
The "community of interest" requirement, however, could lead to
some ambiguity. Since courts have not accepted the argument that
fiduciary duties exist in the "traditional" franchise relationship," it
82 Mass. Senate Bill 110, 1 1(a) (1971). See Cal. Assembly Bill 230, § 4 (1971)
(amending Cal. Corp. Code ; 31005) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 3(a) (1971) ; Vt.
Senate Bill 82, 1(1) (1971). Connecticut has a similar "community of interest" provi-
sion. Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, § 1(2) (1971).
83 Carboneau v. Peterson, 95 P.2d 1043, 1055, 1 Wash. 2d 347, 376 (1939).
84 Brown, supra note 43, at 664. But see Jima, Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada,
Ltd. C19711 13 D.L.R.3d 645 (1970), rev'd, 1 Karas Exec. Rep. No. 14, at 1 (Oct. 11,
1971).
85
 See Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 616 (1874) ; Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l
Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1908) ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 F.
765 (8th Cir. 1906) ; Booker v. Crocker, 132 F. 7 (8th Cir. 1904).
86 Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 622 (1874). See Wheeler v. Abilene
Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1908) ; Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec.
Co., 144 F. 765, 771 (8th Cir. 1906) ; Booker v. Crocker, 132 F. 7, 8 (8th Cir. 1904).
87 Booker v. Crocker, 132 F. 7, 8 (8th Cir. 1904). See Wheeler v. Abilene Nat'l Bank
Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1908); Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 F.
765, 771 (8th Cir. 1906).
88 Compare Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 29 (1971) and Tex. Senate Substitute
for House Bill 709 ; 18.06 (1971). See text infra at p. 558.
86
 But see Jima, Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada, Ltd., [1971] 13 D.L.R.3d 645
(1970) (holding fiduciary relationship to exist between franchisor and franchisee), rev'd
I Karas Exec. Rep., No. 14, at 1 (Oct. 11, 1971).
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may follow that no "community of interest" exists between the fran-
chisor and franchisee. By requiring a, "community of interest" between
the parties in order that their relationship may be included within the
statutory definition, the Massachusetts legislature may have excluded
from coverage every traditional franchise relationship. However, it does
not appear that this construction comports with the intent of the
legislature."
On the other hand, it may be contended that if the statutory defini-
tion does not require fiduciary duties as a prerequisite to inclusion
within the definition, the definition cannot impliedly impose such duties
on relationships otherwise within the statutory coverage, since the
provision would thereby become superfluous. Under proper rules of
statutory construction a court would refrain from a construction of
the definition which would render unnecessary a substantive provision
of the bill. This argument cannot prevail, however, in light of the
specific language of section 5 of the ,bill which, without limiting other
provisions, requires good faith and forbids arbitrary, capricious or un-
conscionable dealings as being unfair or deceptive practices." Under
section 7 of the Massachusetts bill, the attorney general may utilize
judicial proceedings to enforce violations of the statute." While the
imposition of fiduciary duties would prohibit arbitrary, capricious and
unconscionable dealings as well as require a higher standard of con-
duct than "good faith," breach of the fiduciary duties would not
necessarily subject the party to the judicial sanctions of the attorney
general. On the other hand, a breach of fiduciary duties which does
not amount to a breach of good faith or to arbitrary, capricious or
unconscionable dealings could subject the franchisor to liability under
section 7 (b) of the bill." Despite its potential ambiguity, the Massa-
chusetts definition can be interpreted as employing a sweeping ap-
proach which involves limited definitional requirements, while at the
same time creating a broad base for statutory duties and responsi-
bilities.
A second example of the first approach to defining the legislative
scope is the definition contained in the California Franchise Investment
Act:
90 Statement of Harold Brown, app. B, Commentary on Proposed [Massachusetts'
Franchise Fair Dealing Statute (Mass. House Bill 2279), 1970 Hearings, supra nate 69, at
2, 28. Although this statement was made with reference to the original proposed Mass.
bill, the provisions of the present Mass. bill as substantially similar. "fTlhe proposed
definition is all inclusive ." Id.
01 Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 5(a) (1971). See Cal. Assembly Bill 230, § 24 (1971)
(amending Cal. Corp. Code § 31250); Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 4(1) (1971). Washington
merely requires "good faith" dealing. See Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 18(1) (Supp.
1971).
02 Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 7(a) (1971). See similarly Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 6(a)
(1971).
03
 Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 7(b) (1971). See similarly Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 6(b)
(1971).
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"Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either expressed
or implied, whether oral or written, between two or more
persons by which:
(a) A franchise [sic] is granted the right to engage in the
business of offering, selling or distributing goods or ser-
vices under a marketing plan or system prescribed in sub-
stantial part by a franchisor; and
(b) The operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to
such a plan or system is substantially associated with the
franchisor's trademark, service mark, trade name, logo-
type, advertising or other commercial symbol designating
the franchisor or its affiliate; and
(c) The franchisee is required to pay directly or indirectly,
a franchise fee."
This definition has been considered by some authorities as preferable
to the Massachusetts definition because the definitional requirements
are specified in greater detail and therefore the scope of the definition
is not as broad. They feel that the Massachusetts definition encom-
passes "many relationships which are not franchises in the accepted
sense. . . ."" Although this may be true, the lack of breadth of the
California Act may so limit the law's application as to diminish its
effectiveness.
In paragraphs (a) and (b) of the California definition a potential
problem exists in the use of the word "substantial." The problem is
especially severe with respect to subsection (a). It may be possible
for a franchisor to exempt himself from the statutory definition by
carefully limiting the extent to which he controls his franchisees. At
the least this language presents the undesirable prospect of protracted
litigation before its meaning is established.
Requiring a fee as a prerequisite to the existence of the statutorily
regulated franchise relationship is also an undesirable limitation." Not
only does this requirement exclude many existing franchises from the
statutory definition," but it presents franchisors with the temptation
to exempt themselves from statutory regulation's by elimination of
94 Cal. Corp. Code § 31005 (West Supp. 1971). See .Ga. Senate Bill 124, § 3(c)
(1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 3(b) (1971); N.J. Senate Bill 2158, § 3(b) (1971);
Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 2(c) (1971); Ohio Sehate Bill 295 § 1705.01(D) (1971); Wis.
Senate Bill 784, § 553.03(4)(a) (1971).
95
 See Minister's Committee Report, supra note 80, at 37.
99
 Id.
07
 Texas and Illinois, which employ definitions similar to that of California, com-
pounded this danger by adding the requirement that the fee be "in excess of $100." Tex.
Senate Substitute House Bill 709 § 18.03(1)(c) (1971); III. Substitute House Bill 2763
§ 2(c) (1971).
08 Minister's Committee Report, supra note 80, at 38. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken De-
light, Inc. 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 448 F.2d
43 (9th Cir. 1971). The district court, noting that the contracts and written representa-
tions by Chicken Delight'stated that 'there were no franchise fees or royalty payments,
concluded that the payments made to Chicken Delight by the franchisees were solely in
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the franchise fee and recovery of its equivalent in other ways." It
may be true that avoidance in this manner is not possible due to the
inclusion within the statute of the word "indirectly." Nevertheless,
difficult factual issues again present the prospect of extensive litigation
before adequate guidelines may be established..
Some states have attempted to reach a compromise between the
broad definition used by Massachusetts and the more detailed Califor-
nia definition. The Washington statute presents an example of such
an attempt:
"Franchise" means an oral or written contract or agreement,
either expressed or implied, in which a person grants to an-
other person, a license to use a tradename, service mark,
trade mark, logotype or related characteristic in which there
is a community interest in the business of offering, selling,
distributing goods or services at wholesale or retail, leasing,
or otherwise and in which the franchisee is required to pay,
directly or indirectly, a franchise fee.'"
At first glance the definition appears weakened by the inclusion of
a franchise fee requirement similar to that contained in the California
law. Unlike the California law, however, the Washington Act goes on
to define "franchise fee" to include any payment of an initial capital
investment fee, any fee based upon a percentage of sales, training fee,
payment for services, or payment for rent, goods or supplies which
exceeds the fair market value of the item." By extending the definition
of franchise fee to include virtually every type of payment a franchisee
could make to a franchisor, the Washington law has increased the
scope of its definition beyond that of the California law, while at the
same time limiting its definition to those situations where a franchisor
in some way receives payment for the use of his trademark. Thus
where the Massachusetts definition includes within its scope the mere
use of a franchisor's tradename, Washington additionaly requires some
payment for the tied items. The court refused to consider the overcharges on these tied
items as indirect royalty payments and concluded that as a matter of law the overcharges
should be the measure of damages. "This Court will not attempt to restructure the system
of defendants [Chicken Delight] into one which is legally constituted and then allow an
offset for imaginary or suppositious royalty fees." 311 F. Supp. 847, 852 (ND. Cal. 1970).
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed as to the measure of dam-
ages, stating that "neither the existence of damage nor its lack of existence has been estab-
lished as a matter of law...." 448 F.2d 43, 53 (9th Cir. 1971).
90 "There are eight main ways in which the franchisors secure revenue. These include:
initial franchise fee; royalties; rental of premises; sale or !easing of equipment, supplies
and raw materials; sale of franchise productS; [and] sale of territorial rights." Woll,
Sources of Revenue to the Franchisor and their Strategic Implications, 44 J. Retailing No.
4, at 14 (1968). Any one of the latter seven-ways could be used to supplant the franchise
fee.
100 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 1(4) (Supp. 1971).
101 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, { 1(4) (Supp. 1971). Compare Cal. Corp. Code
§ 31011 (West Supp. 1971).
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payment for the use of the trademark, regardless of the form the
payment may take.
A possible similarity between the Washington and Massachusetts
definition is the use of the phrase "community interest" in the Wash-
ington law. However, since this language is defined in another section
of the Washington Act as "a continuing financial interest,'" a court
could' find that because the legislature provided a definition, the judi-
ciary should not look to the common law for guidance but rather
should accept this definition as an expression of legislative intent.
Thus there would not appear to be the same potential for statutorily
created fiduciary duties in the Washington law as there is in the
Massachusetts bill. Finally, the Washington definition appears to pro-
vide the best balance to date between the broad Massachusetts defini-
tion and the restrictive California definition.
A franchise law recently enacted in Florida defines a franchise
as a commercial relationship made pursuant to an oral or written
contract "[wjherein the operation of the franchisee's business fran-
chise is substantially reliant on franchisors for the basic supply of
goods."'" Not only is this requirement fraught with the potential for
litigation to establish when a franchisee is "substantially reliant" on
a franchisor, and to establish what is a "basic supply of goods," but
on its face this requirement appears to exclude virtually all franchises
in which the franchisor, in an attempt to prevent antitrusts suits, per-
mits his franchisees to purchase their goods from third parties. Here,
then, the possibility of escaping regulation is potentially as strong as
it is with California's franchise fee requirement.
New York's pending disclosure bill provides a definition of "fran-
chise" similar to that of Florida. Of the four provisions characterizing
a franchise in the New York bill, the fourth requires that
the operation of the franchisee's business is substantially re-
liant upon the franchisor for the continued supply of goods,
services, guidance or direction. 1 °`
This definition will also require litigation to determine its mean-
ing, including what franchisor assistance is included in the terms
"guidance or direction" and how long the assistance and supplies
must be given in order to be "continued." Finally, unlike that of
Washington, neither the Florida nor the New York definition adequately
reflects the dominant characteristic of franchising: that it is a market-
ing system wherein a franchisor, while not necessarily actively par-
ticipating in the marketing, grants a franchisee, in return for some
form of payment, the right to operate a business selling or distributing
goods or services under the franchisor's trademark.
102 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, 1 1(2) (Supp. 1971).
1 Q3 Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 71-61, 1(2) (Supp. 1971). In addition, the definition requires
that the franchisee be a component of a franchisor's distribution system.
104 N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), 1 681(1)(d) (1971). See similar
Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, 1 1(4) (1971).
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B. Legislative Scope: Statutory Exemptions
Most franchise legislation provides exemptions, based on specific
criteria, for franchisors who would otherwise be included in the statu-
tory definition and subject to regulation. Some experts feel that ex-
emptions are needed due to the long, trouble-free existence of certain
franchises.'" Some exemptions are based upon net worth, the prior
business experience of the franchisor's principals, and a "grandfather
concept" which exempts franchisors who have been selling franchises
for a specified number of years.'"
The California disclosure law exempts from the registration re-
quirements franchisors who (a) have a consolidated net worth of not
less than five million dollars or a consolidated net worth of not less
than one million dollars if they are at least eighty percent owned by
a corporation whose net worth is not less than five million dollars;
(b) have had at least twenty-five franchisees conducting business in
the state for five years prior to the offer, or have conducted business
which is the subject of the franchise for the five years prior to the
offer; and (c) make written disclosures to each prospective franchisee
at least forty-eight hours prior to the sale.'" The Washington law has
a similar exclusion with a further limitation requiring that the fran-
chisor compel an initial investment of more than one hundred thousand
dollars from the franchisee. 108 The exemption requirements of the
proposed Illinois law are similar to those in the California law; how-
ever, the net worth requirement is reduced to two million dollars, and
the disclosures to the franchisee are required to be made seventy-two
hours prior to the sale!" In each case the granting of exemptions is
based upon the fallacious assumption that a franchisor characterized
by size, age, or wealth, or by the fact that he requires a large invest-
100 See A. Pierno, Franchise Regulation—The Need for a New Approach, 44 Los
Angeles B. Ass'n Bull. 501, 505, 534 (1969).
100 Id. at 534.
107
 Cal. Corp. Code § 31101 (West Supp. 1971). See N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 5
(1971) ; N.J. Senate Bill 2158, § 5 (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 4 (1971); Ohio Senate
Bill 295, § 1705.04 (1971) ; Ga. Senate Bill 124, § 5 (1971). However, the Georgia proposal
appears to have a word change which substantially alters the requirements for exemption:
use of the word "or" instead of "and" after requirement (b) makes the requirements for
exemption alternative rather than collective.
108 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 3(4)(c) (Supp. 1971).
10° III. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 5 (1971). See Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.22
(1971), where the net worth requirement is also two million dollars but requiring that
only ten franchisees need have conducted business for five years prior to the offer.
The New Jersey termination bill also provides for exemptions. Excluded are fran-
chises in which the gross sales of products or services between the franchisor and fran-
chisee do not exceed $35,000 during the twelve-month period preceding the institution
of a suit by a franchisee, and where less than 20% of the franchisee's gross sales were
derived from the franchise. N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 4 (1971). "Under these provisions,
application of the statute could depend upon when suit is filed." Report of Lewis Rud-
nick, 4th Annual Franchising and Government Symposium of the 1FA, May 17, 18 and
19, 1971, at 21-22.
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ment by the franchisee, will not take undue advantage of franchisees
or abuse the franchise relationship. The fallacy in these assumptions
lies in equating the above attributes with "honesty.""° As a matter
of fact, the many problems resulting from contractual inequality are
almost by their nature indigenous to large corporations"' and it is
these large franchise corporations which are most likely to meet the
above exemption requirements.
The pending New York disclosure bill grants the attorney general,
to whom supervision of the law would be entrusted, discretion in deter-
mining which franchisees to exempt from the registration and disclo-
sure requirements, provided that the exemptions are "not inconsistent
with the public interest or the protection of potential or existing fran-
chisees."12
 This exemption provision is more flexible than those pre-
viously discussed because it places the right to grant exemptions with
the person to whom enforcement of the law is entrusted, the one in
the best position to determine which franchisors, if any, should be
exempted.
The pending Connecticut bill provides that the law's requirement
of "due cause" for termination or refusal to renew shall not apply to
those written franchises "containing provisions for the binding arbitra-
tion of disputes as to due cause in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. . . ."" 3 Arbitration has been effec-
tively used in other business contexts and should also be effective in
the franchise relationship. 114 Arbitration's most evident attribute is
that it can be used to prevent litigation that is costly to both the
franchisor and the franchisee involved. An exemption provision of this
nature is justifiable since it does not attempt to exempt arbitrarily
some franchisors from all regulation; it merely provides a relatively
informal and inexpensive method of disposition for one limited category
of disputes. -
The various definitions of the term "franchise" and the numerous
franchisor exemptions represent state attempts to draw within the
scope of regulation the desired range of business operations. Once
the scope of the law is established, the state legislatures have available
a variety of approaches to remedying franchise abuses. The first legis-
lative approach to be discussed will be that of disclosure legislation.
C. The Franchise Relationship Begins: Disclosure Legislation
Most franchise legislation to date has dealt with the initiation of
the franchise relationship. It is at this point that the problems of mis-
110 See Brown, Franchising: Legislating Full Disclosure, Good Faith and Fair Deal-
ing, 15 Boston B.J. No. 8 at 15, 20 (1971).
111 Minister's Committee Report, supra note 80, at 38.
112 N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), § 682(8) (1971).
Ha Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, § 4 (1971). Implicit in this exemption is a
requirement that the franchise agreement prohibit termination and non renewal "except
for due cause."
114 See Rudnick, Arbitration of Disputes Between Franchisors and Franchisees, 55
Illinois B.J. 54 (1966).
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representation, deceptive advertising, and criminal involvement can be
dealt with best. This body of legislation is known as disclosure law.
The theory behind it is most ably described by Justice Brandeis' state-
ment that "publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants. . . ." 11°
California was the first state to enact a disclosure law, one which
may serve as a basis for comparison to other such laws. 11 ° This law
requires the registration of all but exempt franchise offerings with the
Commissioner of Corporations.'" Failure to register may render the
franchisor liable to the franchisee for damages, and if the violation is
willful, for rescission as well.'" In addition, the information contained
in the registration form must be disclosed to prospective franchisees
in a prospectus"° at least forty-eight hours prior to the sale of the
franchise."° To supplement the registration and disclosure require-
ments, the law provides for active regulation by the Commissioner.
If the franchisor has failed to demonstrate that adequate financial
arrangements have been made to fulfill his obligations under the offer-
ing, the Commissioner may place in escrow the franchise fees until
the opening of the franchise business, in order to protect prospective
f ranchisees. 121
115 L. Brandeis, Other People's Money 92 (1932).
118 Cal. Corp. Code tit. 4, div. 5 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124 (1971) ;
Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293 (1971) ; N.J. Senate Bill
2158 (1971) ; N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649) (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243
(1971) ; Ohio Senate Bill 295 (1971) ; Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252 (Supp. 1971) ; Wis.
Senate Bill 784 (1971).
ill Cal. Corp. Code 31110 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, 1 7 (1971) ;
Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 7 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, 1 8 (1971) ; N.J.
Senate Bill 2158, § 8 (1971); N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), § 682 (1971) ;
Kan. Senate Bill 243, 1 7 (1971); Ohio Senate Bill 295, 1705.03 (1971) ; Rev. Code
Wash. Ann. ch. 252, 1 2 (Supp. 1971); Wis. Senate Bill 784, 1 553.21(1) (1971).
118 Cal. Corp. Code 1 31300 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, 36 (1971) ;
III. Substitute House Bill 2763, 1 35 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 36 (1971) ; N.J.
Senate Bill 2158, § 36 (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, 1 36 (1971) ; Ohio Senate Bill 295,
1705.22 (1971). See also Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 19(2) (Supp. 1971) ; Wis.
Senate Bill 784, 1 553.51(1) (1971). Washington and Wisconsin permit an action for
rescission even if the violation is not willful. Note that no private right of action is given
franchisees by N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649) (1971),
no Cal. Corp. Code 1 31114 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, 1 11 (1971) ;
Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, 11 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293,	 12 (1971) ; N.J.
Senate Bill 2158,	 12 (1971) ; N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), § 682(6)
(1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, 1 11 (1971) ; Ohio Senate Bill 295, 1 1705.07 (1971) ; Wis.
Senate Bill 784, 553.27(3) (1971).
120 Cal. Corp. Code 1 31119 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, 16 (1971) ;
N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, 1 17 (1971) ; N.J. Senate Bill 2158, 	 17 (1971); Kan. Senate
Bill 243, 1 16 (1971) ; Ohio Senate Bill 295,	 1705.13 (1971); Wis. Senate Bill 784,
§ 553.27(4) (1971). Illinois requires 72 hours. ilk Substitute House Bill 2763, § 17 (1971).
See also Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, 5 8 (Supp. 1971). The New York statute has
no time requirement.
121 Cal. Corp. Code 5 31113 (West. Supp. 1971). A surety bond is permitted as an
alternative to the escrow procedure at the option of the franchisor. See Ga. Senate Bill
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' The benefit of the escrow provision is that it gives the Commis-
sioner latitude in cases where the legitimacy of the franchisor is ques-
tionable. If the franchisor satisfies his obligations, he receives the
escrowed funds; if not, the franchise fee is returned to the franchisee."'
In addition, the Commissioner may issue a stop order denying the
effectiveness of the franchisor's registration if the franchisor has failed
to comply with any of the provisions of the law; or, more importantly,
if the offer or sale of the franchise would constitute misrepresentation
to, or deceit or fraud upon, the purchaser; or, finally, if the Commis-
sioner finds that the criminal background of any person associated
with the franchisor •creates an unreasonable risk to prospective fran-
chisees."' . .
The key section of the law, which has been copied almost verbatim
by other states, contains twenty-two paragraphs specifying information
required in the registration form. 124 For example, a statement dis-
closing the identity and. experience of persons affiliated with the fran-
chisor is required, as is a statement as to whether any one of the
identified persons has been convicted- of a felony, or has had a. civil
judgment entered against him (if,.the felony or civil action involved
fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of property), or is subject
124, § I0 (1971) ; Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 10 (1971); N.J. Assembly Bill 2293,
§ 11 (1971) ; N.J. Senate Bill 2158, § 11 (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 10 (1971) ;
Ohio Senate Bill 295, § 1705.10 (1971) ; Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.27(2) (1971). See
also Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 5 (Supp. 1971). New York requires the franchisor
to hold all payments made by a franchisee prior to, the commencement of operation in a
trust so that these funds cannot be commingled with the franchisor's personal assets. The
funds are held in trust until applied to the purposes stated in the registration. N.Y.
Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649); § 683 (1971).
122 Statement of Clark Bradley, California State Senator [hereinafter cited as Brad-
ley, 1970 Hearings] from Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before
the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select Comm.
on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hear-
ings]. There are others, however, who feel that the provision will be used to place into
escrow all franchise fees until the franchise business is delivered, a practice which, it is
felt, would place the franchisor in a difficult position if he needed the escrowed fees to
equip the franchisee's business. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 78, at 1380. The alterna-
tive procedure of supplying a surety bond may overcome this objection.
122 Cal. Corp. Code { 31115 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, 12 (1971) ;
Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, 12 (1971); N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 13 (1971); N.J.
Senate Bill 2158, § 13 (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 12 (1971); Ohio Senate Bill 295,
§ 1705.11(A) (1971). See also, Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.28(1) (1971). The Washington
law contains additional bases for issuing a stop order: (a) where the franchise offering
sought to be registered is the subject of a permanent or temporary injunction; (b) where
the business or method of business would include activities which are illegal where per-
formed. Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 1. 2 (Supp. 1971). Cf. N.Y. Senate Bill 2321
(Assembly Bill 2649), 1 686 (1971).
124 Cal. Corp. Code § 31111 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, § 8 (1971) ;
Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 8 (1971) , ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, 9 (1971); N.J.
Senate Bill 2158, § 9 ; (1971) ; Kan. Senate Bill 243, 8 (1971) ; Ohio Senate Bill 295,
§ 1705.06 (1971) ; Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, a 4 (Supp. 1971); Wis. Senate Bill 784,
§ 553.26 (1971). New York's registration provision is substantially similar. N.Y. Senate
Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), 1682(2) (1971):
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to any currently effective order of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The fran-
chisor must provide a recent financial statement and a copy of a typical
franchise contract. He must describe any fees, franchise or otherwise,
which are payable by the franchisee. He must disclose conditions for re-
newal or termination. He must also disclose which goods and services
must be purchased from the franchisor, and which goods or services the
franchisee is limited to offering. The franchisor is required to state
the terms of any financing provided for the franchisee, and he must
enclose a copy of any statement of estimated or projected franchise
earnings. The franchisor must disclose the number of franchisees
presently operating, the number yet to be sold, and whether the fran-
chisee receives an exclusive area. Finally, any additional information
required by the Commissioner must be filed and any information de-
sired to be filed by the franchisor may be included.'aa
A copy of .the prospectus which is sent to potential franchisees
must be attached to the registration application."' The prospectus
must contain most of the disclosures required in the application for
registration. The only major disclosures specifically not required' to
be made in the prospectus relate to the criminal record of those per-
sons associated with the franchisor. 127
 Since the Commissioner is able
to deny or suspend the franchisor's registration if he feels that a his-
tory of criminal activity would create an unreasonable risk to the
franchisee, the prospective franchisee is protected even though the
disclosure was not made directly to him.
Although exempt franchisors are not required to register, they
must make limited disclosures directly to the franchisee."' These dis-
closures are the same as 'those required in the registration application
with the excluSion of several important paragraphs. The excluded
paragraphs are those which would require a recent financial state-
ment of the franchisor, identification of those affiliated with the fran-
chisor, information as to the business experience of the franchisor, and
statements as to whether the franchisor or his associates have been
125 Statutes cited, note 124 supra.
1241 Statutes cited, note 119 supra.
J 27 Cal. Corp. Code-§ 31114 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, § 11 (1971);
III. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 11 (1971); N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, N.Y. Senate Bill
2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), § 682(2) (1971); 1 12 (1971); N.J. Senate Bill 2158, § 12
(1971); Kan. Senate Bill 243, 11 (1971); Ohio Senate Bill 295, 1 1705.07 (1971). Such
information is considered by franchisor representatives to be "sensitive." Rudnick, supra
note 109, at 6. This exception does not exist under the Washington and Wisconsin laws.
See Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 8 (Supp. 1971); Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.27(3)
(1971).
128 Cal. Corp. Code § 31101(c)(1)-(14) (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124
§ 5(c) (1)-(14) (1971); Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, § 5(c) (1)-(19) (1971); N.J. As-
sembly Bill 2293, § 5(c)(1)-(14) (1971); N.J. Senate Bill 2158, 1 5(c)(1)-(14) (1971);
Kan. Senate Bill 243, 1 4(c)(1)-(14) (1971); Ohio Senate Bill 295, § 1705.04(c)(1)-(14)
(1971); Rev. Code Wash. AIM. ch . 252, § 3(4)(d)(1)-(xvi) (Supp. 1971); Wis. Senate
Bill 784, § 553.22(3) (a)-(n) (1971).
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convicted of a criminal offense, held liable in a civil action relating to
fraud, or subject to an order of the SEC or FTC.129 Since this informa-
tion is not readily available to the franchisee from any other source,
the exclusion means that the prospective franchisee can unknowingly
buy a franchise from a bankrupt franchisor or from one who has a
criminal background. Not only is the franchisee of an exempt franchisor
not protected from these abuses by the escrow provision or stop orders
of the Commissioner, but the franchisee cannot even determine for him-
self whether the franchisor has "adequate financial arrangements" or
if the franchise is subject to "unreasonable risks" because the dis-
closures from which the franchisee could glean this information are
specifically excluded from the disclosure requirements. It is not un-
reasonable that certain information remains undisclosed to the fran-
chisee when he is protected by the full sweep of registration. However,
when this safeguard is not available, as in the case of the exempt
franchisor, the franchisor's right to privacy should fall and disclosure
of criminal records to the franchisee should be required.'"
Although the registration and disclosure requirements of the Wash-
ington law are substantially similar to those of California, the pro-
visions providing for active regulation by the Director, Washington's
counterpart of the California Commissioner, are more liberal. Under
the Washington law the Director may place into escrow all franchise
fees "if he finds that such requirement is necessary and appropriate
to protect prospective franchisees,""" and not solely because he ques-
tions the franchisor's financial arrangements, as in the California law.
Another prefranchise regulation to be found in disclosure legis-
lation involves advertising. It provides that no franchise advertisement
may be published unless a copy of the advertisement has been filed
with the state prior to publication.m Furthermore, no advertisement
may be published if it is found to contain any false or misleading
statements or if it omits any statements necessary to prevent the
120 Compare statutes cited at note 124 with statutes cited at note 128. Note that New
York does not have required disclosures for exempt franchisors. But see the Illinois statute
which excludes only the recent financial statement of the franchisor. Ill. Substitute House
Bill 2763, § 5(c) (1971).
180 The New York proposal does not require the franchisor's criminal history to be
disclosed to the franchisee, but it must be included in the "franchisor registration" state-
ment which must be filed with the attorney general's office. N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assem-
bly Bill 2649), § 682(1) and (2) (1971). If the attorney general utilizes his power to
exempt franchisors from the registration requirements of the bill, he should require the
franchisor, thereby exempted from registration, to disclose all material information, in-
cluding criminal history, to the franchisee.
181 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 5 (Supp. 1971).
182 Cal. Corp. Code § 31156 (West Supp. 1971). See Ga. Senate Bill 124, * 28 (1971) ;
Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 28 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 28 (1971) ; N.J. Senate Bill
2158, I 28 (1971) ; N.Y. Senate Bill 2321 (Assembly Bill 2649), § 682(4) (1971); Wash.
Ann. ch. 252, 1 10 (Supp. 1971) ; Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.53 (1971).
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advertisement from being misleading."' A similar provision has been
successfully used under California's Corporate Securities Law."'
Although the disclosures required in both pending and enacted
disclosure legislation of other states are substantially similar to those
of California, variation in approach does exist. For example, the dis-
closures required of franchisors under the Texas bill are made directly
to the franchisee; there is no registration requirement.'" This regula-
tory approach relies exclusively on private enforcement by franchisees
through litigation. Under the liability section of the Texas bill, a fran-
chisee may sue for damages if the disclosure is misleading or untrue
and, if the violation is willful, he may sue for rescission.'"
The Florida disclosure law also requires limited disclosures
directly to the franchisee. The provisions of the law prohibit intentional
misrepresentation by failure to disclose the known required total invest-
ment for the franchise or by failure to disclose efforts to sell or estab-
lish more franchises than the market may reasonably be expected to
sustain."' Furthermore, it is unlawful under the Florida statute to
misrepresent intentionally the prospects of a proposed or existing fran-
chise. " Enforcement is limited to a civil action for rescission with
the right to recover reasonable attorney's fees.'"
Texas and Florida both utilize the direct disclosure approach to
compensate for the fact that they do not maintain adequate adminis-
trative machinery to implement effectively a disclosure law requiring
that the franchisor register with a state department.'" This adminis-
trative difficulty is just one of the many reasons that experts insist
upon the necessity of a single federal franchise law."' Until such
183 Cal. Corp. Code § 31157 (West Supp. 1971); Ga. Senate Bill 124, I) 29 (1971);
Kan. Senate Bill 243, § 29 (1971) ; N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, § 29 (1971); N.J. Senate Bill
2158, 29 (1971) ; Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 11 (Supp. 1971). The pending Con-
necticut bill provides that "no franchisor shall . engage . . . in methods of competition
with any franchisee which constitutes unfair methods of competition within the meaning
of the Federal Trade Commission Act IFTCA]." Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, § 5
(1971). Deceptive advertising of all types falls within the scope of the Federal Trade
Commission's jurisdiction. Although the FTCA does not provide a remedy to the individual
who has been defrauded, in recent cases the FTC has ordered refunds to deceived fran-
chisees. See, e.g., Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 19,340 (1970) ;
Universal Electronics Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 7 19,390 (1970). See Glickman, Fran-
chising, § 8.02[1] (1971).
184 Bradley, 1970 Hearings, supra note 122, at 602.
135 Tex. Senate Substitute House Bill 709, § 18.04 (1971). The disclosures required
ere substantially similar to the disclosures required in the California registration applica-
tion. Due to the absence of administrative regulation, disclosure of the criminal history of
the franchisor's principal officers is required. Id. at § 18.04(b) (5).
188 Tex. Senate Substitute House Bill 709, 18.07(a) (1971).
137
 Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 71-61, § 2 (1) (b) & (c) (Supp. 1971).
188 Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 71-61, § 2(1)(a) (Supp. 1971).
138 Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 71-61, 3 (Supp. 1971).
140 Rudnick, supra note 109, at 4-5.
141 Id. at 5; cf. Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 Hast. L. J. 1347, 1382
(1970).
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legislation is enacted, state disclosure legislation must be relied upon,
whether it be of the direct type such as the Texas law, involving
slow and potentially inconsistent judicial proceedings, or the registra-
tion type such as the Washington Franchise Investment Protection
Act.
Finally, the enforcement provisions of the disclosure laws should
be examined. If the franchisor violates an exemption or registration
provision the franchisee may sue for damages. If the violation is wil-
ful, he may sue for rescission as well. The same remedies are provided
if the franchisor makes an untrue statement or omission of a material
fact.'" However, these laws also provide that if the franchisor can
prove that the franchisee "knew the facts concerning the untruth or
omission, or that the [franchisor] exercised reasonable care and did
not know, or, if he had exercised reasonable care would not have
known of the untruth or omission," the action can be defeated.' One
critic considers this defense to be a serious weakness in the effective-
ness of the law: this is "the first time that contributory negligence has
been made a defense to fraud."'"A further weakness in these enforce-
ment provisions is the limitation of recovery to actual damages. Be-
cause franchisors need only fear the loss of their ill-gotten gains, they
may not be dissuaded from illegality. This limitation on recovery is
also undesirable because the franchisee is not sufficiently protected
from losses that are not included in the category of "actual damages."
Whatever equitable interest the franchisee may have built up in the
business may be unrecoverable.
Proponents of the Washington disclosure law, however, believe
that it avoids these shortcomings.'" Under this law a court in its dis-
cretion may increase the award of damages to an amount "not to
exceed three times the actual damages sustained" or may grant any
other relief it considers appropriate. 146 The statute, however, retains
the franchisor's defense of contributory negligence in an action for
rescission based upon fraudulent misstatement or omission, although
it does not retain this defense in an action for damages. 147 Granting
the franchisor this defense in an action for rescission is equitable be-
142 Cal. Corp. Code	 31300 & 31301 (West Supp. 1971); Ga. Senate Bill 124, §§ 36
& 37 (1971); Ill. Substitute House Bill 2763, 11$ 35 & 36 (1971); Kan. Senate Bill 243,
§§ 36 & 37 (1971); N.J. Assembly Bill 2293, §§ 36 & 37 (1971); N.J. Senate Bill 2158,
§§ 36 & 37 (1971); Ohio Senate Bill 295, §§ 1705.22 & 1705.23 (1971); Tex. Senate Sub-
stitute House Bill 709, § 18.07 (1971); Wis. Senate Bill 784, § 553.51(1) & (2) (1971).
But see Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 19 (Supp. 1971).
148 See statutes cited in note 142 supra.
144 Brown, Franchising: Legislating Full Disclosure, Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
15 Boston B.J. No. 8, at 15, 20 (1971). While this statement may be an oversimplification,
the liability provisions are unduly complicated and at times appear incapable of consistent
application.
146 Id.
146 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 19(3) (Supp. 1971).
142 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 19(2) (Supp. 1971). See Wis. Senate Bill 784,
§ 553.51(1) (1971).
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cause the franchisee should not be permitted to escape his obligations
under the contract after he has been negligent in entering into it. At
the same time, however, the franchisee should be permitted to collect
damages for the franchisor's violations of the disclosure law.
Although a disclosure law is an important step towards controlling
franchise abuses, it is only a half-way measure.'" Disclosure laws do
nothing to protect the franchisee during the existence of the franchise
relationship from abuses resulting from an overly-restrictive fran-
chise agreement. As one commentator has stated with respect to the
California disclosure law, "no matter how unfair the terms of the
agreement, how inexperienced the franchisor or how unproven the
product, the Commissioner would be powerless to prevent the sale as
long as the franchisor makes a full disclosure."'" Although disclosure
informs the prospective franchisee and exposes the restrictive agree-
ment before the contract is made,"° many prospective franchisees be-
come so involved with thoughts of their own business that they lose
all objectivity, not fully analyzing or comprehending the significance
of the disclosures. Thus the franchisee often consents to an overly-
restrictive franchise agreement"' which is a product of inequality in
bargaining power. 152 The franchisee must either accept the standard
contract presented to him or look elsewhere. The franchisee's interest
almost inevitably leads him to accept the adhesion contract. Thus the
need for substantive regulation during the life of the relationship re-
mains.
D. The Ongoing Franchise Relationship: Substantive Legislation
Substantive regulation protects the franchisee during the period
of the franchise relationship. The basic protection is often afforded by
a "good faith" provision as exemplified by that of the Washington
148 "Disclosure alone simply isn't enough. . . In the securities field, where you have
relatively sophisticated investors, disclosure works well. But in franchising investors usually
aren't that sophisticated. You can make disclosures till you're blue in the face, but they
alone won't solve the problems of franchise abuses." Clarke, Wash. State Assistant Attorney
General quoted in Wong, In Absence of Federal Rules, More States Begin Regulating the
Franchising Industry, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1971, at 22, col. 2.
142 Comment, A Tempest in a Chicken Bucket: Some Reflections on Franchise Reg-
ulation in California, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1101, 1128-29 (1970).
no Id.; see also IFA Position Paper, "Views of the International Franchise Associa-
tion Relative to State Franchise Legislation" (1971) (on file in office of B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev.): "In contrast, disclosure legislation protects the franchisee by providing
the information needed to select a franchise appropriate to his business abilities and a
franchisor capable of and intending to implement its franchise program—without in any
material way interfering with the right of the franchisor and the franchisee to define by
agreement the terms of their legal relationship." Id. at 4.
151 H. Brown, Franchising: Trap for the Trusting 7 (1969).
152 Canadian Dept. of Financial & Commercial Affairs, Report of the Minister's Com-
mittee an Franchising, at 39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Minister's Committee Report].
One franchisor's counsel has advised franchisee's counsel that the franchisee should be
instructed that the franchise agreement constitutes an almost complete subordination of
the franchisee's business and merchandising will to that of the franchisor. Katz, Fran-
chising—Pro and Con, 76 Case & Cotn. No. 5, at 8, 9 (1971).
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law: "The parties shall deal with each other in good faith.'" It would
appear that such a provision makes further regulation unnecessary."'
However, this requirement, without specific guidelines, would be too
ambiguous to be of practical value and would suffer from the litigation
potential it affords. It is at best an expression of legislative intent
which demonstrates the law's focus and purpose.
The Washington Act's requirement of good faith dealing between
the parties is therefore supplemented by specification of conduct con-
sidered to be unfair or deceptive, or that comprising an unfair method
of competition."' Prohibited conduct includes restricting the f ran-
chisee's right to join an association of franchisees. Since most fran-
chisors discourage collective bargaining,"° such a provision is necessary
to provide franchisees with a "degree of equalization . . . in their
negotiations and dealings with the franchisor."'" Requiring the fran-
chisee to purchase goods or services from the franchisor or from ap-
proved sources is also prohibited unless the franchisor can prove that
such restrictive purchasing agreements are reasonably necessary for
a lawful purpose, justified on business grounds, and that they do not
substantially affect competition. In light of Siegel v. Chicken Delight'a
this requirement is not only reasonable, it may save both franchisors
and franchisees the expense and bother of protracted litigation. Despite
the fact that most tying arrangements have long been considered viola-
tive of the antitrust laws, franchisors continue to employ such arrange-
ments. The prohibition of tying arrangements in the Washington law,
places the burden of proof on the franchisor to establish that the
arrangement is not anticompetitive."' Failure to bear this burden may
subject the franchisor to liability under the damage provisions of the
Act. At the same- time. franchisees are protected, in most instances,
from the costly abuses of kickbacks and overpriced items.
Another prohibited form of franchisor conduct is discrimination
between franchisees with respect to royalties, goods, or services, un-
less the franchisor proves that the discrimination is reasonable, based
on justifiable distinctions and not arbitrary. This substantive regula-
153
 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, 18(1) (Supp. 1971). See also Cal. Assembly Bill
230, § 24(a) (1971) (to amend Cal. Corp. Code f 31250(a)); Mass. Senate Bill 110,
§ 5(a) (1971); Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 4(1) (1971).
154 Statement of Harold Brown, app. B, Commentary on Proposed Franchise Fair
Dealing Statute, (Mass. House Bill 2279), 1970 Hearings, supra note 122, at 2, 27
[hereinafter Brown, 1970 Hearings]. Although this statement was made with reference
to the originally proposed Mass, bill, its provisions are substantially similar to the present
Mass, proposal and the Wash. law.
155 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 18(2) (Supp. 1971). See Cal. Assembly Bill
230, § 24(b) (1971) (to amend Cal. Corp. Code Q 31250(b)); Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 4,
5(b) (1971); Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 4(2) (1971).
158 Minister's Committee Report, supra note 152, at 39.
157 Brown, supra note 151, at 93. See N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 8(b) (1971).
158 445 F,2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
158 This provision may give certain procedural advantages to the plaintiff franchisee
vis h vis an antitrust suit.
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don also applies to discriminatory termination attempts by a fran-
chisor.'" Successful franchisees are sometimes arbitrarily terminated
in an attempt by the franchisor to take over a profitable operation and
thereby obtain all the profits for himself. Also prohibited by the Wash-
ington statute is the sale or lease of any product or service for more
than a fair and reasonable price. Thus if a franchisor is able to meet
the "lawful purpose" and "insubstantial effect on competition" require-
ments of the Act and thereby able to require the franchisee to purchase
certain goods or services from him, the franchisor must still deal fairly
with the franchisee and charge only a reasonable price. However, deter-
mining a reasonable price will be difficult in such instances, since most
of these goods and services will be unavailable elsewhere.
A further form of prohibited franchisor conduct is the obtaining
of money or any other benefit from someone with whom the franchisee
is doing business, unless such benefit is promptly accounted for and
transmitted to the franchisee. This is a concerted attack on the kick-
back problem'm which is said to be so prevalent that some suppliers
make the payment to the franchisor by corporate check even with-
out his demand.'" A forthright attempt at controlling such a blatant
abuse is laudable.
A final provision prohibits the franchisor from competing with
the franchisee or granting competitive franchises in the market area
previously granted to another franchisee. One abuse this provision at-
tempts to control is franchisor competition with a franchisee since
" [d] irect competition by a franchisor at the same economic level as
its franchisees is pregnant with every type of economic abuse, par-
ticularly when combined with pervasive control over the activities of
the franchisees."'" Another abuse this provision seeks to remedy, a
practice which has been difficult to control, is the glutting of a terri-
tory by a franchisor with as many franchisees as possible.'" Since
the franchisor bases his royalty payments on a percentage of gross
sales and not on a percentage of profit, he has no reason to be interested
in whether the individual franchisees are able to show a profit.'" The
more outlets there are in a given area (up to a saturation point), the
greater the likelihood of increased gross sales, even though each out-
let suffers lower individual sales and smaller profits.
The remaining practices which are considered to be deceptive or
unfair methods of competition under the Washington Act are: the
requirement of a release from a franchisee, which would relieve any
person from liability imposed by the law; the imposition on a fran-
100 See Minister's Committee Report, supra note 152, at 42-43.
161 Brown, 1970 Hearings, supra note 154, at 36 (statement made with reference to
a proposed Mass. provision identical to the provision in the recently enacted Wash. law).
162 Brown, supra note 151, at 16.
163 Brown, 1970 Hearings, supra note 154, at 36.
164 See also FIR. Stat. Ann. ch. 71-61 § 2(c) (Supp. 1971).
108 Brown, 1970 Hearings, supra note 154, at 36.
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chisee of a standard of conduct that is unreasonable or unnecessary;
and the termination or failure to renew a franchise without just
cause. leo
Similarly, a proposed New Jersey franchise law would prohibit
the granting of an additional franchise in an established franchisee's
designated geographical area "unless the franchisor shall give to the
existing franchisee 180 days notice of its intention to grant an additional
franchise and such franchisee shall have failed to substantially comply
with reasonable and nondiscriminatory requirements imposed upon
him by the franchise, the burden of proving such failure being upon
the franchisor." 1°7 Since failure to comply with reasonable and non-
discriminatory franchisor requirements is also the basis for justified
termination under the New Jersey law,'" the question arises why the
franchisor is permitted to add an additional franchise in the same
geographical area instead of terminating the first franchise agreement
and then making a new agreement with a second franchisee. The pur-
pose of the law, it seems, is to give the franchisor an opportunity to
establish a new franchisee in the geographical area before terminating
the noncomplying franchisee. This prevents a period during which no
franchisee is operating in the geographical area and the resulting loss
of customers to a competing franchising system.
It would appear, however, that the rights of the entering fran-
chisee are ignored if the franchisor, having established a new franchise,
is permitted to transfer the previously existing franchise to a second
franchisee. In light of the law's purpose, the franchisor should not be
permitted to transfer, take over, or refuse to terminate the noncomplying
franchisee's franchise once a new franchise has been established. Rather,
the franchisor must be considered as having elected to terminate the
noncomplying franchisee by instituting a new franchise in the area.
Upon termination of the noncomplying franchisee, the provisions of
the law prohibiting establishment of an additional franchise in a geo-
graphical area would apply and the rights of the entering franchisee
would thereby be protected.
The Massachusetts proposal, a good part of which was used as
a basis for the Washington law, goes further than the Washington law
in its attempt to protect the franchisee during his relationship with the
franchisor. The Massachusetts Franchise Fair Dealing Act, for the
most part similar to the Washington law, at the outset imposes a re-
quirement of good faith dealing by the parties.'" Going beyond the
scope of the Washington law, the Massachusetts bill details the rights
of the franchisees to bargain collectively, permits their selection of a
collective bargaining agent, requires the franchisor to bargain collec-
tively with the agent selected by the franchisees and encourages the use
160 For a discussion of termination see p. 558 infra.
167 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 7 (1971).
188 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 5 (1971); See discussion p. 561 infra.
160 Mass. Senate Bill 110, 	 5(a) (1971).
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of collective bargaining by associations of franchisees.'" In addition,
the Massachusetts proposal provides that the federal antitrust laws as
construed by the federal courts govern the relations of the parties;
that it is unlawful for the franchisor to impose unreasonable restric-
tions having to do with transfer, sale, renewal, or termination; that the
defense of "unclean hands" is not available to the franchisor, and that
in any proceeding, the damages caused by the franchisor's violation
of the Act be given weight."'
Arkansas recently enacted a brief statute dealing with the ongoing
franchise relationship. The law represents an attempt to end unfair
discrimination in franchise fees among franchisees,'" an abuse no other
state has yet sought to control. The relevant section provides:
It shall be unlawful for a franchisor to charge an Arkansas
Franchisee a royalty fee for use of a service mark, trade mark,
or trade name which is greater than the lowest royalty fee it
charges to any other of its franchisees in the United States.'"
Buttressing this requirement is an enforcement provision imposing a
fine of up to one thousand dollars for each violation and permitting
recovery of treble damages by any franchisee harmed by violation of
the provision.'" Some experts, however, believe that this law cannot
be constitutionally applied to existing franchise relationships'" be-
cause it would abridge the "contract clause" of the United States Con-
stitution."°
Three major factors must be weighed in determining whether a
statute violates the contract clause: "the nature and strength of the
public interest served by the statute, the extent to which the statute
modifies or abrogates the asserted preenactment right, and the nature
of the right which the statute alters.'" Since the Arkansas Act is
declared to be an emergency measure, it could be found to be a "proper
occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the State to protect
the vital interests of the community,'" and hence constitutional. Not
permitting a franchisor to charge a franchisee in the legislating state
a greater royalty fee than that charged any other franchisee may be
a reasonable legislative measure within a state's police power.'"
170 Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 6 (1971). See Vt. Senate Bill 82, § 5 (1971).
171 Mass. Senate Bill 110, § 5 (1971).
172 Cf. Brown, supra note 151, at 11.
178 Ark. Act 252 of 1971, § 2 (1971) (Ark. House Bill 346, § 2 (1971)).
174 Ark, Act 252 of 1971, § 6 (1971).
175 See Report of Lewis Rudnick, 4th Annual Franchising and Government Sym-
posium of the IFA, May 17, 18 and 19, 1971, at 29 (Report on file in office of B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev.).
179 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 provides that "[filo State shall . . . pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .."
177 C. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legis-
lation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 697 (1960).
178 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
179 Cf. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3), 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 512, 621, 852 at 884-87 (1944).
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, The Texas approach to substantive regulation may also be com-
pared to that of Washington. Whereas the basis of the Washington
law is a good faith provision supplemented by specific guidelines, the
Texas law employs a good faith requirement which incorporates exist-
ing standards of conduct. The Texas bill requires that
. the franchisor and the franchisee shall prior and subsequent ,
to the execution of a binding franchise or other agreement
have the mutual obligations to deal fairly, openly, honestly,
and in good faith and to exercise reasonable care and diligence -
in complying with all provisions of the franchise and other
agreements between them.'"
This provision imposes upon the parties mutual obligations of a
fiduciary nature; thus well-recognized principles govern their conduct.
This approach does not focus on specific franchise abuses but deals in
general terms and so creates some difficulty; although in theory the
protections provided by fiduciary obligations are available to the fran-
chisee, they often are not sufficiently well known or understood by the
franchisee (who may not be represented by counsel), and thus the
fiduciary obligations may not. be observed in practice.
E. The Franchise Relationship Ends: Termination Legislation
Although termination and nonrenewal are merely one type of
franchisor abuse requiring substantive regulation, they have been con-
sidered by some legislatures to be of such importance that they have
been given singular and separate attention. The first state law to deal
with franchise terminations was the Delaware Franchise Security
Law,1 e' enactment of which was marked by derision's' and criticism
that it would stunt the growth of franchising capital in Delaware. 183
The stated purpose of the law is protection of franchised distributors
from threatened and actual termination by suppliers and licensors "on
short notice without just cause."'" The law provides that a franchisor
shall not "unjustly terminate a franchise""s or "unjustly fail or refuse
to renew a franchise."'" Termination or nonrenewal is considered un-
just if made without good cause or in bad faith.'" In addition, the
law provides remedies for a franchised distributor whose franchisor
unjustly terminates, refuses to renew, threatens to terminate, or threat-
180 Tex. Senate Substitute House Bill 709, § 18.06 (1971).
181 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, H 2551-57 (Supp. 1971). See also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. II),
§ 278a (Supp. 1970).
182 Rudnick, supra note 175, at 2.
188 Pelletier & Strauser, Franchise Legislation, in Franchise Litigation and Legislation
205, 209 (G.A. Pelletier & H. Brown eds., P.L.I., 1971).
184 Preamble to 57 Dei. Laws, ch. 693 in 6 Del. Code Ann. at § 2551 (Supp. 1970).
185 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2552(g) (Supp. 1970).
186 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2552(h) (Supp. 1970).
187 Del. Code Ann, tit. 6, § 2552(a), (b) (Supp. 1970).
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ens to refuse to renew a franchise; remedies include damages and the
right to secure an injunction.'"
Two problems were originally seen in the Delaware law. Franchisee
wholesalers appeared subject to the provisions of the law but franchisees
who offered services to the public appeared to be excluded."' In addi-
tion, damages proposed in the relief section were "so excessively gener-
ous to franchisees as practically to invite judicial evasion."'" These
underlying problems were cited by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co.,' although they were not
the basis for that decision. The major problem with the Delaware law
was its conflict with the contract clause of the federal Constitution, and
it was on this ground that the Globe Liquor court declared much of
the law unconstitutional.'"
In Globe Liquor, Four Roses Distillers Co. had granted Globe
Liquor Co. a franchise to distribute Four Roses' products in Delaware.
The contract provided for automatic expiration one year after in-
ception. One month prior to the expiration date Globe was notified that
Four Roses did not intend to renew the franchise agreement. Globe
brought an action contending that the Delaware Franchise Security
Law prohibited a unilateral termination and requesting both damages
and injunctive relief.
The Court of Chancery certified four questions of law for decision
by the- Supreme Court of Delaware. The questions included whether
the Delaware Franchise Security Law violated Section 7 103
 or 8"4 of
Article I of the Delaware Constitution, or Article I, Section 10 108 or the
Fourteenth Amendment"' of the United States Constitution. Four
Roses had argued that, under Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution the Delaware Franchise Security Law should be found
unconstitutional as vague and indefinite and thus as depriving a fran-
chisor of property without due process of law. The Delaware Supreme
Court disagreed, believing that the statutory standards of "good cause"
and "bad faith" have a well-Settled meaning in law "even though there
could be differences of opinion as to elements  of degree."'" The court
388 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2553(a) (Supp. 1970). Ninety days' notice must be
given in any case before termination or failure to renew. Id. at I 2554.
188 Pelletier & Strauser, supra note 183, at 208.
190 Id. at 209.
- Del, —, 281 A.2d 19, 23 (1971) ; cert. denied, — U.S. —, 92 S.Ct. 103 (1971).
taa Id. at
	
281 A.2d at 21.
193 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall [not] be deprived of .. .
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Four Roses argued
that this section was applicable because the damage provisions of the Delaware Franchise
Security Law were punitive measures.
104 "No ... man's property [shall] be taken or applied to public use without the
consent of his representatives, and without compensation being made."
108 "No State shall	 pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ...."
190 "No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of
law...."
197 - Del. —, 281 A.2d at 22.
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concluded that this settled meaning was sufficient to establish an "in-
telligible standard of conduct." 198
Four Roses also argued that the distinction between wholesale and
retail franchises made by the Law violated the Fourteenth Amendment
as well as the Delaware Constitution, because it was arbitrary and
without justification in light of the statutory purpose. The court again
disagreed, upholding the classification on the basis that there were
sufficient, though unspecified, facts to show that the classification was
reasonable in light of the law's purpose, 199
 Four Roses' main argument,
and the one upon which the case turned, was that the Franchise Se-
curity Law impaired the obligations of a contract and thus violated
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The court
agreed, noting that the statutory damages were "savagely punitive" and
were recoverable even absent proof by the terminated franchisee of any
actual damages.20° The court determined that the law provided a cause
of action based on a mere threat to terminate."' The court concluded:
We think the Delaware Franchise Security Law . . . makes
a substantive change in the rights and obligations under this
contract. These substantive changes are the imposition on
Four Roses of the obligation to deal with Globe indefinitely,
and the imposition of a penalty in the form of damages if it
attempts to insist on its contractual rights. It is therefore not
a minor change or infringement permissible under the exercise
of the police power. It is therefore proscribed by the Contract
Clause of the Federal Constitution. 202
Other states addressing themselves to the termination problem face
the serious question whether a law can be drafted that will be upheld
as constitutional and still be strong enough to protect franchisees.
The biggest problem facing the state legislatures does not arise so much
from termination as from the failure to renew. A franchisor, in attempt-
ing to terminate, is in a sense breaking the franchise relationship. Al-
though there may be provisions in the contract permitting termination,
if these provisions are unreasonable a court would find little difficulty
in refusing to enforce the provisions in light of legislative attempts to
remedy the problem of unjust termination.'" On the other hand, a
los Id.
199 Id. at —, 281 A.2d at 22-24.
'200 Id. at —, 281 A.2d at 21.
2" These facts also led the court to conclude that the damages allowed by the statute
amounted to a taking of private property without compensation and without due process
of law. Id. at —, 281 A.2d at 24.
202 Id. at —, 281 A.2d at 21.
203 See Gellhorn, Limitation on Contract Termination Rights—Franchise Cancellation,
1967 Duke L.J. 465 (1967). But see Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563 (1970)
(holding that a Puerto Rican law which prohibited a manufacturer from terminating
or refusing to renew a dealership except for "just cause," regardless of the provisions of
the contract, and which provided substantial damages in case of a violation, gave rise to
constitutionally impermissible retroactive alteration of contractual provisions).
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refusal to renew a franchise, even if not based on just cause, can hardly
be considered unreasonable per se. To prohibit refusals to renew in
effect creates a contract of indeterminate duration.' As the Delaware
court found, this would substantially change the rights and obligations
of the parties under the contract.'
The recently enacted New Jersey termination law contains pro-
visions similar to those of the Delaware law. 2 " 0
 It requires sixty days'
notice detailing the reasons for the termination or refusal to renew,
but grants as a complete defense the right to terminate for good
cause.'" The statute defines good cause to mean failure by the f ran-
chisee substantially to comply with those requirements imposed upon
him by the franchise, requirements which must be reasonable and
nondiscriminatorily enforced. The institution of this "complete de-
fense" creates some ambiguity, however. For instance, it is not
clear whether the franchisor with good cause to terminate must
still comply with the sixty days' notice requirement, or whether the
franchisor who gives the sixty days' notice must still have good cause to
terminate. "It is probable that the good cause defense is limited to the
legality of the termination or refusal to renew, with the 60 days advance
notice required whether or not the franchisor has good cause."'"
There are two exceptions, however, to the notice requirement. In
those instances in which the franchisee voluntarily abandons the fran-
chise relationship, written notice may be given fifteen days in advance
of termination or nonrenewal; and if the franchisee was convicted of
an offense directly related to the business conduct of the franchise,
termination or refusal to renew may be effective immediately upon the
delivery and receipt of written notice at any time following the con-
viction.'" By way of remedies, New Jersey provides for assessment
of damages and injunctive relief 210
The pending Connecticut bill is substantially similar to the New
Jersey law's termination sections, requiring written notice together with
a statement of the reasons for the termination or nonrenewal.211
 The
Connecticut bill specifically requires that no franchisor terminate,
cancel or fail to renew a franchise except for due cause. 212
 It should be
noted that both the New Jersey law and the Connecticut bill follow
the Delaware approach and apply the same limitations on terminations
and refusals to renew as were struck down in the latter state. Regard-
204 Rudnick, supra note 175, at 21.
200 Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., — De]. —' 281 A.2d 19, 21 (1971).
200 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063 (1971) (passed by both Houses but unsigned by the Gov-
ernor).
207 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, 5 (1971).
208 Rudnick, supra note 175, at 24.
200 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 5(1)(2) (1971).
210 N.J. Assembly Bill 2063, § 11 (1971) (as enacted, the treble damages provision
was removed).
211 Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, 	 2 (1971).
212 Conn. Substitute Senate Bill 1474, § 3 (1971).
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less of whether such limitations are desirable, they are unconstitutional
according to the Delaware Supreme Court.
Massachusetts goes even further with this approach of question-
able validity:
It shall be unlawful directly or indirectly to:
(1) Harass, intimidate, or coerce a franchisee to enter
into any agreement or to do or refrain from doing
any other act prejudicial to the franchisee or to ac-
complish such result by threatening to cancel or to
fail to renew any franchise or any existing con-
tractual agreement. . . .
(2) Terminate or cancel the franchise of any such fran-
chisee without due cause. The nonrenewal of a
franchise without due cause shall constitute
an unfair termination or cancellation, regardless of
the terms or provisions of such franchise. Such
franchisor shall notify a franchisee in writing, and
forward a copy of such notice to the attorney general
. . . at least sixty days before the effective date .. .
and in no event shall the contractual term of any
such franchise expire, without the written consent of
the franchisee involved, prior to the expiration of
at least sixty days following such written notice. 213
Thus the Massachusetts law is almost entirely favorable to the fran-
chisee and presents potentially greater violations of the contract clause
than those in the Delaware law.
Perhaps the only state law restricting termination that has any
possibility of surviving a constitutional attack is the Washington Fran-
chise Investment Protection Act. It provides that both failure to renew
and termination are permissible for
just cause, or in accordance with the current terms and
standards established by the franchisor then equally appli-
cable to all franchisees, unless and to the extent that the fran-
chisor satisfies the burden of proving that any classification
of or discrimination between franchisees is reasonable, is
based on proper and justifiable distinctions considering the
purposes of this act, and is not arbitrary.
The franchisor may thus terminate or refuse to renew a franchise
even though the grounds for such action would be considered unjust,
if the action is not applied discriminatorily against individual fran-
chisees. If a franchisor refuses to renew the franchise of an individual
franchisee, the statute requires justification by the franchisor of this
discriminatory action. As long as the franchisor can show that the
213 Mass. Senate Bill 110, 5(b)(1)(2) (1971).
214 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, 4 18(2)(i), (j) (Sapp. 1971).
214
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discrimination between franchisees is reasonable, and based on proper
and justifiable distinctions, his refusal to renew will be upheld even
if the franchisor does not have "just cause."
Under the Washington law a franchisor is thus not required to
deal "indefinitely" with a franchisee. The only requirement is that all
franchisees be treated equally—a reasonable regulation and perhaps
one that does not violate the contract clause. The Washington law
additionally provides that upon termination the franchisee shall receive
compensation for his inventory, supplies, equipment, furnishings, and
any prepaid costs and expenses paid to the franchisor.'" This pro-
vision mitigates the financial shock of termination and avoids unjust
enrichment of the franchisor. There is no similar provision for the
nonrenewed franchisee. This is not necessarily a weakness, however,
because the nonrenewed franchisee should have been amortizing the
cost of these items over the contract period and his reasonable expecta-
tions are not the same as those of a terminated franchisee.
The numerous problems caused by terminations and refusals to
renew are difficult to remedy. This difficulty is compounded by the
proscriptions of the contract clause in the federal Constitution. Al-
though perhaps the Washington law presents the most viable regulation
in this area, other possible solutions should be examined. One such
possibility is the stipulation of a reasonable time limit or probationary
period within which the franchisor can either terminate or refuse to
renew in accordance with the contract. The evils of the termination
context are the use of threats of termination to force franchisee com-
pliance with objectionable franchisor demands and the use of actual
termination as a method of taking over profitable franchises. There-
fore the probationary period should be short enough to insure that
neither use can remain a viable possibility, yet long enough to grant
the franchisor an opportunity to observe the new franchisee and to
decide whether continuation will be mutually beneficial. Eighteen
months should be a sufficient amount of time for the franchisor to make
such a decision and yet not a long enough period for him to be able
to use the threat of termination in his attempts to control the fran-
chisee. Furthermore, this period is not long enough for the franchisor
to determine that the franchise will be so profitable that it is worth
taking over. After the eighteen-month probationary period the fran-
chisor would be permitted to terminate a franchise only for just cause.
Since the difficulty that states have in regulating refusals to renew
is in attempting to do so without violating the contract clause, some
reasonable balance must be reached between the right of the franchisor
to refuse to continue the contract indefinitely and the franchisee's
interests. Provision for a probationary period may provide this balance;
up to the end of the period it may be assumed that the franchisee
could not have built up a substantial equitable interest in the business
and thus both parties should abide by their agreement that the contract
21 Rev. Code Wash. Ann. ch. 252, § 18(2)(j) (Supp. 1971).
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end. After the probation period, however, the interests of the fran-
chisee, particularly in the goodwill he has developed, would be assumed
to outweigh the rights of the franchisor protected by the contract
clause; therefore the franchisor should not be allowed to refuse to re-
new the franchise except for good cause. It is not unlikely that a court
would take notice of the legislature's attempt to differentiate between
those franchisees which have built up a sufficient interest in the fran-
chise to require protection and those which have not. The court could
recognize this attempt to balance the rights of franchisors and fran-
chisees as a "proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power
of the State to protect the vital interests of the community,” 2" and
therefore find that the statute does not violate the contract clause.
Another possible solution to the termination problem may be to
permit both terminations and refusals to renew in any case but to grant
the terminated or nonrenewed franchisee damages equal to the goodwill
he has built up in the franchise. This would permit the franchisor to
use his own discretion in determining which franchisees to retain. Since
there is no requirement to deal indefinitely, but only a provision that
reasonable compensation be made for the goodwill value built up by
the terminated or nonrenewed franchisee, there would be no violation
of the contract clause. Whatever solution is accepted, however, the
franchisee should not be entitled to damages for the mere threat of
termination or nonrenewal by the franchisor. If the franchisor is not
allowed arbitrarily to terminate or fail to renew, or if the franchisee is
compensated for his equitable interest upon termination or nonrenewal,
a threat of such action can have no damaging effect on the franchisee.
IV. THE FEDERAL PROPOSALS
Although this survey has dealt with state franchise legislation, the
federal legislative proposals of Senators Williams and Hart and the
recently proposed Trade Regulation Rule of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) should be briefly examined for comparison purposes,
and possibly as preemptive regulation. Senator Williams' proposed
Franchise Fair Practices Act of 1971 would employ the FTC to super-
vise the public disclosures required of all franchisors under the Act.'
The exemption provision of the bill is similar to the New York
exemption provision. It grants substantial discretion to the Com-
mission in determining which franchisors to exempt from the public
disclosure requirements 218 The disclosures required by the Williams
bill are essentially the same as, although not identical to, those
required by the California and Washington disclosure laws. Some
additional provisions in the federal law that are of particular in-
terest are the requirement of a statement of the length of time neces-
218 Home Bldg. & Loan Assin v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
217 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See 117 Cong. Rec. 12,775 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1971).
218 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Secs. 4 (1971).
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sary to obtain the franchise, including the average length of time be-
tween the signing of a franchise agreement and the opening of the
franchised outlet; a statement of the number of franchisees that
operated at a loss during the previous year; a statement, subject to
limitations by the Commission, of available earnings of past and present
franchises; and an objective analysis of the performance of franchises
which details franchise failures and resales to the franchisor."'
The FTC may issue an order suspending the effectiveness of the
disclosure statement if at any time it finds false or misleading state-
ments or omissions of a material fact in the disclosure.22° Awards of
treble damages, attorney fees and court costs are available to private
litigants prejudiced by such false or misleading statements or omissions,
or who are the victims of any unfair or deceptive act or practice pro-
hibited by the act.2" That this proposed federal disclosure legislation
is more stringent than the state disclosure laws is indicated by the
lack of specific exemptions and the requirement of more specific dis-
closures.
On November 10, 1971,   the FTC proposed a Trade Regulation
Rule substantially similar to the Williams bill. The proposed regulation
has as its final required disclosure "[a] statement explaining clearly
the terms and effects of any covenant not to compete which a franchisee
may be required to enter into." 222 Neither the Williams bill nor any
state disclosure legislation requires a similar disclosure. Since, as
previously mentioned, most prospective franchisees do not consider the
consequences which the restrictive franchise agreement may have upon
them during the contract period, they probably do not consider the
consequences the agreement may have on the period following the
end of the relationship. Thus the need arises for such a disclosure. The
proposed FTC Rule also requires a statement, in bold face print, grant-
ing the prospective franchisee a ten day cooling off period during which
he may cancel the contract for any reason and receive a full refund. 22a
The essential difference between the proposed FTC regulation
and the Williams bill, however, is in the area of remedies. The FTC
Rule provides that a failure to comply with any requirement imposed
by the regulation will be a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA). 224 The Williams bill, on the other hand, pro-
vides civil remedies to the defrauded franchisee in addition to any reme-
dies available to the Commission under the FTCA. 22' Thus, although
the franchisee is protected by the required disclosures of the proposed
219
 Id. at § 7(15), (21), (23).
229 Id. at § 6(d).
221 Id. at § 9(c).
222 FTC Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Involving Disclosure Requirements and Pro-
hibitions Concerning Franchising, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 50,310, at 55,657, if (27) (Nov. 10,
1971).
223 Id. at 55,657.
224 Id. at 55,656.
225 S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1¢ 9, 11 (1971).
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FTC Rule, he has no private remedy if he is damaged because of a
violation of the Rule. This deficiency in the proposed FTC regulation
may require remedial legislation. The proposed rule is not "intended
to abrogate or supersede any State laws imposing the same or more
stringent requirements . . ." 2" and therefore state legislation may pro-
vide private remedies if Congress does not.
Although federal disclosure regulation is an important step toward
the control of franchise abuses, it is not a complete solution. There
have been no federal proposals for comprehensive substantive regula-
tion of the franchise relationship, although there have been attempts to
deal with the termination problem. The 1971 version of Senator Hart's
"Fairness in Franchising Act" presents the federal version of termi-
nation legislation. The bill prohibits cancellation, termination or refusal
to renew by the franchisor except for good cause and legitimate business
reasons.'" Senator Hart contends that the bill would allow termination
even if the franchisor merely wants to take over the business himself,
provided, however, that reasonable compensation is paid for the fran-
chisee's business, including the goodwill. This is a questionable con-
clusion in light of the express language of the bill.'" The above
prohibition would not apply, however, if the written franchise agreement
contained provisions for the binding arbitration of disputes in ac-
cordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. 229
This exemption is similar to that provided in the proposed Connecticut
termination bill. The Hart bill also requires ninety days' notice prior
to any termination or nonrenewal action by the franchisor.'" As in the
Delaware law, the bill allows damages for the mere threat of termi-
nation, cancellation or refusal to renew. 281 Damages, however, must be
shown to have been sustained by the franchisee."' As the court in
Globe Liquor stated: "it is difficult to visualize . . . any damage flowing
merely from a threat to terminate. . . .""8
CONCLUSION
The franchise relationship subjects the franchisee to extensive
abuses from the moment the relationship begins until long after it
ends. The traditional actions for fraud and antitrust violations as well
as regulation through the securities laws have failed satisfactorily to
220 FTC Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Involving Disclosure Requirements and
Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. I 50,310, at 55,658, Note I (Nov.
10, 1971).
227 S. 2472, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1971) found in 117 Cong. Rec. 13502 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1971).
228
 See 117 Cong. Rec. 13501-02 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1971). The bill requires both
good cause and legitimate business reasons.
223 S. 2472, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1971).
280 Id. at I) 3.
231 Id. at § 4.
232 Id. at § 7.
238
 Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., — Del. —, 281 A.2d 19, 21 (Del.
1971).
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remedy these abuses. The inadequacies of these remedies created an
urgent need for direct legislation to regulate the franchise field. Enacted
and proposed state legislation has taken three approaches and has
attempted to remedy three distinct areas of abuse: disclosure legislation
attempts to inform the prospective franchisee of his rights under the
contract prior to his entry into it; substantive regulation attempts to
protect the franchisee during the contract period; finally, termination
legislation attempts to deal with the special problems created by termi-
nation and refusal to renew.
The proposed FTC Rule and federal bills offer uniformity to what
may become a patchwork of state legislation. This uniformity alone is
sufficient to warrant the enactment of these federal proposals. Until
federal legislation or regulation is forthcoming, however, the states
must continue to regulate independently, basing their own legislation
upon the experiences of states that have already legislated.
Among the legislation surveyed in this comment, the Washington
law appears to be the most comprehensive and equitable law to date;
it deals most comprehensively with the abuses confronting the fran-
chisee. It provides the most balanced definition of "franchise" of any
that has been proposed. It provides registration of the franchise and
requires disclosure directly to the prospective franchisee in order to
assist him in his determination of whether to purchase a franchise.
This law also provides substantive regulation of the franchise relation-
ship in an attempt to equalize the bargaining strength of the two parties.
Finally, to date the Washington law presents the most realistic ap-
proach to termination regulation. Its only drawback is that it permits
franchisors requiring large investments to be exempt from the disclosure
requirements.
It is regrettable that the International Franchise Association was
able to postpone the effective date of the Washington law for an entire
year' in an attempt to have it repealed. 235 Such action on the part
of franchisor-oriented groups promotes and prolongs the unfair and
abusive treatment to which many franchisees have been subjected. It
also underscores both the reason and the necessity for governmental
regulation if the franchise method of operation is to have "the ad-
vantage . . . of enabling numerous groups of individuals with small
capital to become entrepreneurs."'
DAVID E. KRISCHER
2" The Washington law does not become effective until May, 1972. Rev. Code Wash.
Ann. ch. 252, § 30 (Supp. 1971).
285 This "major attack on the bill" is currently taking place. Wong, In Absence of
Federal Rules, More States Begin Regulating the Franchising Industry, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Oct. 11, 1971, at 22, col. 3.
238 Susser v. Carve] Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; aff'd, 332 F.2d
505 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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